Who would pay for a railroad that crossed the Hudson?
A regional rail plan reached the state legislatures. Why did the new transit district never exist?
Explore the caseRegional transportation institutions took shape through agreements and disagreements over money, jurisdiction, representation and operating control. This chronology follows those decisions across New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, with links to the reporting and records behind them.
Begin with a historical conflict below, or use the complete timeline to trace events by date. The companion newspaper archive preserves the reports themselves. Event dates describe when something happened; publication dates describe when its sources appeared.
Read the history, follow dated turning points, then examine the original evidence.
A regional rail plan reached the state legislatures. Why did the new transit district never exist?
Explore the case ↗Why could eleven affirmative votes fail to approve a regional plan—and how did the commission disappear?
Explore the case ↗What did the football train demonstrate about coordinating railroads—and what remained untested?
Explore the case ↗Dates refer to events; source citations include publication dates.
284 events
Engineer L. Alfred Jenny proposed a loop rapid-transit line from the Hackensack Meadows under the Hudson to about 57th Street, down Manhattan, and back through Jersey City, with transfer stations wherever it crossed a New Jersey railroad. The New York–New Jersey Port and Harbor Development Commission turned it down. Jenny kept offering variations for 30 years.
The Legislature set up the commission to study the transit problem. It took a traffic census in 1924 and warned in its 1926 report that New Jersey “must give immediate and thoughtful consideration to the transit problem.”
The North Jersey Transit Commission published an engineering plan for a loop rapid-transit system connecting Manhattan with the North Jersey railroads.
The Port of New York Authority and the North Jersey Transit Commission organized the board with railroad officials and the Westchester Planning Committee to coordinate plans for an area-wide solution.
After spending more than $220,000 on studies, the board produced another loop plan but adopted no program, and disbanded. The North Jersey Transit Commission ended the same year with a warning that the highway projects under way would not meet all the area’s needs.
The association’s 1935 report said: “Motor vehicles cannot supplant rail facilities as a means of commuter transportation between New Jersey and Manhattan.” The North Jersey Transit Committee, formed the same year, backed a transit plan by consulting engineer L. Alfred Jenny of Dumont.
Valentine Christian proposed a 37½-mile open-cut railroad from Mahwah to the George Washington Bridge and across its lower level. The proposed system was estimated at $41 million and became one of the unbuilt alternatives later recalled in debates over a regional commuter network.
The Bergen County Rapid Transit Association proposed a subway from Paterson along Route 4, across the George Washington Bridge and downtown via the Ninth Avenue elevated. Its $40–50 million plan included feeder connections from the Susquehanna and West Shore railroads and north–south buses.
Ordered in 1936 to make a new study, the Port Authority proposed a suburban rapid transit system for northern New Jersey that carried the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad from 33rd Street to 51st Street and across to New Jersey through a new tunnel. Its report said good rapid transit could add millions of dollars in property values. The New Jersey Legislature directed another study; in 1939 the Authority asked for more time, “and nothing more was heard of the proposal.”
Two articles date the plan to 1937; The Jersey Journal’s 1966 account gives 1938.
New Jersey legislators considered a bill to create a railroad authority. The proposal died when the Legislature adjourned.
Governor Alfred E. Driscoll suggested that commuter railroads share a terminal in the Hackensack meadows where riders could transfer to a rapid-transit line into Manhattan.
At the Port Authority’s request, engineers Coverdale & Colpitts studied improved rail access between Newark Airport and Manhattan. Their proposal extended Hudson & Manhattan to the airport and reorganized rail connections around it; the Inter-Municipal Group for Better Rail Service later objected that the arrangement would lengthen Jersey Central commuters’ journeys.
The New Jersey Legislature established the Regional Planning Commission, headed by Senator David Van Alstyne. Its work developed a regional approach to the metropolitan rail problem and preceded the separate New York and New Jersey rapid-transit commissions created in 1952.
After two years studying commuter transportation, the Regional Plan Association recommended a special interstate commission to examine the regional transportation system as a whole. President Paul Windels later presented that proposal as the basis for a fresh approach to rail investment and Manhattan congestion.
The New Jersey Regional Planning Commission, headed by State Senator David Van Alstyne of Englewood, recommended that a metropolitan rapid transit authority be created and report to the 1953 Legislature. Its report also recommended a new rail tunnel connecting North Jersey with Manhattan at about Forty-fifth Street.
Senator David Van Alstyne introduced a metropolitan rapid-transit commission bill in New Jersey on February 11; Senator Greenberg of Brooklyn introduced its counterpart in New York on February 21. The Regional Plan Association endorsed the two bills on March 3, arguing that rail improvements were essential to relieving road congestion.
Governor Driscoll appointed the commission’s members, among them Senator Van Alstyne. The legislation creating it provided $50,000 for studies of transit improvements. New York had set up a separate commission of its own.
Goodhue Livingston Jr. criticized the New York commission for “dragging its feet” and said it had been stymied by Governor Dewey. The commission’s vice chairman acknowledged that no staff had been hired; New York had given its commission $10,000 and New Jersey $20,000.
Hearings before the New York Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission, with New Jersey’s commission sitting in, renewed interest in seeing the region’s mass transportation needs whole. A subsequent New York Times editorial called the question of subsidizing commuter railroads the first to decide.
Hudson & Manhattan Railroad president William Reid proposed a five-year, $250 million program combining the existing downtown Hudson Terminal loop with a new uptown loop serving Rockefeller Center, Grand Central and Herald Square. A new New York–New Jersey public authority would take over the railroad as the nucleus of the system.
Former New York State Senator John A. Hastings presented the transit commissions with a proposal to use the Long Island Rail Road and new routes linking Long Island, Manhattan, New Jersey and Staten Island. He proposed a bi-state authority financed with tax-exempt revenue bonds and advertised trains capable of 150 miles an hour.
New Jersey Senator Malcolm S. Forbes announced a redrafted resolution asking the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission to study existing and potential rail facilities. He proposed that the Port Authority finance the study and undertake no additional projects not already under construction until potential rapid-transit solutions had been examined.
After the separate commissions issued almost identical reports, both Legislatures adopted their recommendation and the New York–New Jersey Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission came into existence, with $50,000 from each state. Its vice chairman dated this to June 1954; a 1955 New York Times editorial gives June 14, 1953.
The Regional Plan Association recommended extending the BMT 14th Street–Canarsie line beneath the Hudson from its Eighth Avenue terminus to the western Jersey City meadows. The proposal would connect converging commuter railroads and parking areas with Manhattan’s north–south subways and direct service to Brooklyn.
New York Central president Alfred E. Perlman disclosed that the railroad was considering elimination of West Shore passenger trains and ferries to reduce losses. Assemblyman William V. Musto urged intervention by the governors and the Port Authority, while Weehawken officials said they would await a formal abandonment application before acting.
A memorandum of understanding between the Port Authority and the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission was made public. The Authority would furnish up to $500,000 for engineers to study rail rapid transit between New Jersey and New York. The memorandum urged a “constitutionally sound, financially practicable and politically feasible plan of meeting deficits.”
Governor Averell Harriman signed New York’s renewal of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission and a $150,000 appropriation conditioned on an equal contribution from New Jersey. The measure restored the New York commission’s statutory authority after the previous Legislature expired at the end of 1954, but the funds still depended on action across the Hudson.
At Governor Robert B. Meyner’s request, the entire New Jersey membership of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission resigned so that he could select a new delegation. Chairman Charles H. Tuttle said the resulting lack of a quorum prevented contracts, consultant appointments and other official action while the replacement members awaited Senate confirmation.
Governor Meyner announced he would approve a $150,000 appropriation for the commission. With $150,000 approved by New York and $500,000 available from the Port Authority, the Times wrote, “an inquiry of respectable thoroughness should be possible.” Meyner also named a new set of New Jersey members.
The Monmouth County Planning Board adopted a resolution urging the commission to include the county in its study of New York–New Jersey transit problems, citing its growth in year-round commuter traffic.
Henry K. Norton, chairman of the New York, Susquehanna & Western Railroad, presented the commission with a plan for rapid transit lines from the tri-state suburbs running on overhead tracks in New York. Real estate operator William Zeckendorf objected that the city would not stand for another elevated railroad.
The Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission voted to study New Jersey routes linking Newark, Passaic, Paterson and Hackensack, north–south travel in Hudson County, and transit associated with the Essex County Freeway. These investigations would be coordinated with interstate work and newly contracted studies for Westchester, Long Island and Staten Island.
The New York, Susquehanna & Western Railroad petitioned New Jersey’s Public Utility Commission to abandon its entire passenger operation, then running 60 trains a day. The application brought another North Jersey commuter line into the regional fight over whether existing rail services should survive while the metropolitan transit study was under way.
The Citizens United Transit Committee adopted a resolution seeking preservation of metropolitan passenger rail and ferry services until the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission completed its study. The group asked regulators to withhold abandonment approvals and urged legislative intervention if they had not acted by June 30.
Representatives of West Shore, Erie Northern Branch and Susquehanna commuters formed the Suburban Transit Association at Teaneck to coordinate resistance to service abandonment. James P. Birch became temporary chairman of the organization, which initially represented about 8,000 riders and planned to bring in additional railroad groups.
Mayor Robert F. Wagner Jr. convened the Metropolitan Regional Conference, later known as the Metropolitan Regional Council. This voluntary association of the top elected officials of the counties and major cities of the tri-state region discussed shared problems such as regional traffic control and water and air pollution. New York City paid most of its $50,000-a-year cost.
The chamber announced it would present its program to the commission on September 10. Three points, including a new East River tunnel at 76th Street, were already in engineering studies the commission had authorized.
John A. Kervick of the commission told the Jersey City Real Estate Board that rail transit everywhere requires some public support, but that the commission expected a proposal costing “no way near the fantastic estimates of a billion and upward.” Co-chairman Charles H. Tuttle warned the same day that only a strong interstate body could keep a transportation policy going.
Paul W. Johnston told the Bergen County Chamber of Commerce that commuter railroads should be paid for unprofitable service as utilities are, with any excess cost spread among the municipalities that benefit. The Record concluded that the choice in rail commuter service “seems to be abandonment or subsidy.”
Regional Plan Association vice president C. McKim Norton called on New Jersey, New York and federal regulators to maintain existing rail and connecting ferry facilities until the metropolitan transit study and commission recommendations were available. RPA argued that physical facilities and, wherever possible, current service levels should be retained during that work.
William Miller’s 135-page financing study for the commission found that the two states could legally authorize the Port Authority to undertake rail rapid transit, but that the Authority’s lack of taxing power and its self-supporting policy “deprive the Port Authority of competence to undertake such a project.” He recommended a Metropolitan Rapid Transit District.
The New Jersey Legislature passed Senator Malcolm S. Forbes’s resolution asking that decisions on passenger-service curtailments wait until the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission reported. The resolution sought to preserve the operating rail network while a coordinated regional replacement was being considered.
Project director Arthur W. Page recommended two new Hudson River tunnels, at about Fifty-ninth Street and at the Battery, carrying a rail loop that would connect New Jersey’s commuter lines with Manhattan over BMT subway tracks. A new bi-state district with a 32-member council would run it and assess counties for an estimated $12 million annual deficit.
About 100 county leaders in Teaneck heard the commission’s executive director outline the plan. Bergen’s share of the deficit would be $1.84 million a year, the largest of any county. Formal hearings were set to begin June 18 in Newark.
Representative Frank C. Osmers Jr. proposed an alternative to building new Hudson tunnels: use Hudson & Manhattan’s tubes, the planned George Washington Bridge lower deck and, if necessary, a Lincoln Tunnel tube. The tentative proposal sought economies in a regional loop, but confronted capacity limits and prior commitments of the road crossings to motor traffic.
New Jersey’s Public Utility Commission deferred decisions on passenger-service reductions until the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission delivered its year-end report. Applying the Legislature’s resolution to the Susquehanna’s pending petition, the commission said the future of the region’s entire transportation system had to be considered.
The Interstate Commerce Commission granted requests to discontinue Hudson River ferry lines used by riders on three railroads serving Bergen County. A federal court order kept the ferries going pending a final decision.
The Jersey City Merchants Council called the Page plan a threat to the city’s business community. It objected to Hudson County paying about $1,560,000 a year toward the deficit and said a loop into Manhattan would bypass Hudson County shopping centers.
The commission opened hearings in Newark on what The Record called “the nineteenth New York area transportation survey since the early 1920s,” moving to New York on September 17. Critics, including Representative Frank C. Osmers Jr. and engineer L. Alfred Jenny, pressed lower-cost alternatives.
At the Arden House conference on metropolitan problems, Robert Moses said that if any agency was needed to unify rapid transit it should be the Port Authority, and called the railroads “a busted, lazy and backward private enterprise.” The Port Authority’s executive director rejected the idea at once, saying transit would wreck the Authority’s credit.
The Bergen County Chamber of Commerce announced opposition to Arthur W. Page’s $400 million rail-loop proposal, calling its prospective operating deficits economically unsound. The chamber urged continuation of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission, with additional money if needed, to study more practical alternatives using existing facilities.
The panel included the chairman of the New York City Transit Authority, the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad’s trustee, and the president of the Central Railroad of New Jersey. Morris Pesin of the Jersey City Merchants Council planned to ask “what Jersey is going to get out of it.”
State Senator Walter H. Jones of Bergen County pledged to support a workable program after the commission’s final report, but hoped it would not carry “a $12 million deficit millstone around its neck.”
The commission’s modified plan dropped the BMT tracks for a new subway up Fifth and Madison Avenues and routed the line through Journal Square, raising the cost by $100 million and the annual deficit to $14.5 million. Critics called it “disappointing,” “wasteful,” and “monstrous.” New York’s attorney general said a constitutional amendment might be needed.
The Transportation Act of 1958 expanded the Interstate Commerce Commission’s authority over railroad passenger-service discontinuances. The Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission warned that reliance on state regulators and courts could no longer assure continued commuter operations, while Senator Clifford P. Case later called for an investigation of the drive to abandon services.
After three years and more than $1 million of study, the commission recommended a $500 million loop and, as its one legislative proposal, a bi-state transit district to plan and negotiate a system. It concluded that a coordinated, modernized system of transit by rail and bus between New York and New Jersey was essential.
Two reports are dated January 1959. Articles from February, November, and December 1958 describe the final report as already delivered, supporting a January 1958 date.
A Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission staff report proposed shifting Queens and Brooklyn riders to expanded rapid transit so that the Long Island Rail Road could give Nassau and Suffolk faster service. The recommendations included eventual rapid-transit use of the Port Washington branch, fewer suburban stations, stronger feeder-bus service and additional station parking.
A Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission staff report recommended modernizing the existing New York Central and New Haven services rather than building a parallel subway system for Westchester. It favored a metropolitan district acquiring control of the suburban services and operating them directly or by contract, with Westchester and Fairfield supplying an estimated $1.706 million annual subsidy.
Governor Robert B. Meyner declined to endorse the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission’s $500 million loop, calling construction a Herculean task while warning that Hudson & Manhattan might soon shut down. He pressed the need for an immediate alternative for commuters as Jersey City sought cost estimates for a Jersey Central connection to the tubes.
Senator Walter H. Jones introduced a bill to create a Metropolitan Transit District with a 32-member council, 16 from each state, and $150,000 a year from each state for five years. An identical bill was introduced in the New York Legislature the same day. Any plan would need approval from both Legislatures.
Hudson & Manhattan trustee Herman T. Stichman outlined a $190 million alternative connecting the existing downtown tubes to the Lexington Avenue subway and the uptown branch to the Sixth Avenue subway, with a new Hudson tunnel near 59th Street. He proposed public acquisition of the profitable Hudson Terminal buildings to offset much of the system’s subsidy requirement.
The Metropolitan Regional Conference accepted a committee report opposing a separate interstate air-pollution agency and favoring action through the conference. Members also backed an area-wide warning system for dangerous air pollution and approved a joint recreation-facility inventory with the Regional Plan Association, extending cooperation beyond the rail crisis.
The Metropolitan Regional Conference postponed specific action on the proposed transit district after a Hunter College debate. A committee led by Jersey City Mayor Charles S. Witkowski had urged inclusion of Connecticut and coordination through the conference itself; members called for further study after transit director Frank H. Simon defended a district with statutory powers.
Democrats delayed a Senate vote on the Jones bill. Senator William F. Kelly of Hudson said: “I shall not let the Page report erase Hudson County from the map and run a loop around it instead of through it.” Jones replied that the new agency was meant to produce a plan more acceptable to the public.
New York’s Public Service Commission authorized New York Central to end passenger service on its Putnam Division. The decision sharpened the regional debate over whether to preserve existing commuter lines while New York and New Jersey considered a new metropolitan transit district.
The Newark Citizens Committee on Municipal Government proposed that Newark, Jersey City, Hoboken, Harrison and New York City create a North Jersey Transit Authority to purchase the bankrupt Hudson & Manhattan Railroad. Bonds backed by the five municipalities would finance acquisition and connections to the Jersey Central and New York subways; local officials differed over whether the Port Authority should instead take the responsibility.
Governor Harriman approved New York’s participation in the bi-state district. Mayor Wagner, as chairman of the Metropolitan Regional Council, had urged more study. “I do not believe we should wait for another year,” Harriman said. The district still needed New Jersey’s approval and ratification by Congress.
The Joint Committee of Municipal Groups of Northern New Jersey publicly opposed creation of a separate transit authority. Counsel Augustus S. Dreier argued that the Port Authority’s existing revenues and coordinated control of rail and road facilities offered a way to sustain commuter service without new local taxation.
At a three-hour meeting convened by Senator Donald C. Fox, Essex County representatives resisted an appeal from transit co-chairmen Edward J. O’Mara and Charles H. Tuttle to support the bi-state district bill. They objected to deficit financing, New Jersey’s prospective share of costs and New York City’s representation; only the Glen Ridge representatives supported the plan.
The Moonachie Borough Council circulated a resolution asking Bergen County freeholders to appoint a committee on the merits of municipal consolidation. The proposal entered a wider debate over the county’s fragmented local government, as Hackensack Area Development Association director Walter D. Head urged planning for land use and services beyond individual town boundaries.
The council of elected officials voted unanimously to oppose the bill. The Times called it a “curious subversion of stated purpose.” The council’s secretary, Maxwell Lehman, answered that members wanted a tri-state approach that included Westchester and Fairfield from the start and did not separate transit from traffic, and that the council had authorized itself to draft a new measure.
Most legislators from the North and Central Jersey counties that would join the district, apart from Bergen, opposed it, reasoning that any commuter rail service would run a deficit their constituents would pay. Assemblyman William V. Musto of Hudson introduced a bill to make the Port Authority take on the task instead.
The Senate passed the Jones bill, S-50. Opponents later said the necessary eleventh vote came from Senator Sido Ridolfi of Mercer County, and that seven of the eleven senators in favor represented counties that would bear none of the deficit.
At a Trenton conference over commuter service, Governor Robert B. Meyner suggested a separate Port Authority rapid-transit division whose bonds would be guaranteed, and deficits met, by New York and New Jersey. The proposal sought to preserve the Authority’s credit while giving it a rail role, though Meyner acknowledged the difficulty of obtaining public approval.
Mayor Robert F. Wagner’s office announced consideration of New York Central’s offer to cede its taxable operating facilities within the city for municipal maintenance and operation. City Administrator Charles F. Preusse described a Grand Central connection that could carry commuter trains over subway tracks to lower Manhattan, while the railroad would rent facilities for its continuing passenger services.
The council’s Committee on Housing and Redevelopment started updating housing data last collated in 1950, when 10.2 percent of the region’s housing units were sub-standard, as part of a push for federal housing funds.
Herman T. Stichman, trustee of the bankrupt Hudson & Manhattan Railroad, told a Bergen County group that the Port Authority “has never concerned itself with the rail transportation problems of the metropolitan area.” He said connecting Erie and Susquehanna trains to the tubes and subways could be done for less than $100,000,000.
In a letter to the Governor and Legislature, the commission said the transit district act “does one thing only—it creates a public agency, based on local representation, to develop and to negotiate such a public plan.” The Herald News noted that Congress had since given the Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction over railroad passenger service, and the ICC was letting railroads curtail it.
Lyle C. Fitch, First Deputy City Administrator, told the National Tax Association that the only clear benefit of the half-billion-dollar loop would be to its users, who should pay the entire bill. He called transportation “a region-wide problem” needing coordination of agencies and pooled revenues. He spoke for himself, not the city administration.
The Jersey City Commission adopted a resolution opposing the bill. Morris Pesin of the Jersey City Merchants Council called the loop “a noose around the neck of Jersey City” and urged the Assembly to compel the Port Authority to connect New Jersey’s railroads to the Hudson & Manhattan tubes instead.
Governor-elect Nelson A. Rockefeller said he would seek an early meeting with Governors Meyner and Ribicoff. “Something has got to be done about transit and transportation before the end of the year,” he said. Meyner said he would be “delighted” to join, and that he was willing to amend the district bill to meet objections.
Frank H. Simon told the Hackensack Area Development Association that “you and I will not in our lifetimes see them take on rapid transit projects.” He called a comprehensive regional agency the desirable ultimate, but said anyone attempting it “would be like Don Quixote attacking the windmill.”
Port Authority executive director Austin J. Tobin argued for more than two hours that the Authority could not spend on transit and submitted a 46-page memorandum. The Assembly’s economist, Dr. Salomon J. Flink, countered in a 57-page report that the Authority could set aside earnings to cover part of a transit deficit. The commission’s co-chairmen asked for action; the Regional Council asked for a tri-state approach.
About 20 people attended a Newark hearing on how to tackle metropolitan problems; Newark was the only New Jersey municipality to send an official. The council, elected officials who had met informally for more than two years, was weighing whether to seek formal status, and a committee under Columbia’s Wallace Sayre was to report on January 13.
After two public hearings the bill was rewritten as a ten-member agency appointed by the two governors, with any property tax for deficits expressly barred. It reached the floor but lacked the votes. The Lehigh Valley and the Lackawanna then said they would seek to abandon most of their passenger services.
Jersey City Mayor Witkowski, who had led the council’s opposition to the district, called its traffic and transportation committee together: “Having played a large role in the defeat of the transit district, I feel it is up to the regional council to offer constructive plans.” Senator Clifford P. Case called for a Senate investigation of efforts to rid railroads of commuter service.
A Regional Plan Association committee of eight headed by Columbia’s Wallace S. Sayre urged that the voluntary council be established by identical statutes in the three states and a compact approved by Congress, with a small full-time secretariat. “The present mass transportation crisis,” it said, “is but a foretaste of the difficulties which will soon and increasingly press upon the region.”
In his annual legislative message, Governor Robert B. Meyner endorsed the Assembly’s substitute for the rejected 32-member transit district. The revised approach called for a ten-member board, excluded a real-estate tax and left room for Port Authority financial assistance; Meyner required responsiveness to local groups and veto powers protecting each state and its governor.
With the commission preparing to go out of business, the Port Authority opposed, and the counties unwilling to be taxed, Senator Wesley L. Lance proposed a state Division of Railroad Transportation to act as a “catalyst agent.” He said the Port Authority should underwrite part of any deficit: “When we speak of rapid transit, we are speaking about a deficit operation.”
Governors Rockefeller, Meyner, and Ribicoff held a transit conference and heard railroads, labor, communities, and the Port Authority. Senator Walter H. Jones called it “a black day for New Jersey commuters and for the growth of regional concepts,” saying the governors of New York and Connecticut had washed their hands of the commuter problem.
The Senate passed the Assembly’s bi-state transit district bill 12 to 1, with most abstainers calling it futile, and the Assembly voted 53 to 3 for a State Division of Railroad Transportation in the Highway Department. The district bill could not become law unless New York enacted identical legislation. A bill to hand the problem to the Port Authority stayed in committee. In Albany the Senate voted 56 to 1 for an Office of Transportation in the governor’s executive department.
Governor Meyner signed the bill setting up a bi-state rapid transit agency. Two weeks later New York passed a different version, and New Jersey had to amend its law to match.
Asked by Senator Lance whether the Authority might help pay for a connection between the Jersey Central and the Hudson & Manhattan, estimated at $15 to $40 million, Austin J. Tobin replied that it was legally impossible to contribute from present revenues or reserves.
The Plainfield Common Council voted unanimously for the resolution despite a letter from Tobin warning that involvement in the rail crisis “could well lead to the destruction of the Port Authority as a useful agent.” The sponsor answered that “the Port Authority was created to do this job.”
By 39 to 15 the Assembly approved a New York–New Jersey Transportation Agency with one member from each state and $25,000 from each, and by 36 to 16 let the Port Authority borrow $20 million from New York State to buy coaches for lease to three New York railroads. Opponents said the car program was meant to preclude a larger Port Authority role. Assemblyman Musto asked who Austin Tobin was “to tell us they can’t do it,” adding: “We created the Port Authority.”
Governor Meyner and Highway Commissioner Dwight R. G. Palmer were cool to the Regional Plan Association’s proposal for a three-year study of metropolitan transportation. “There are so many agencies now, I would like to see some of them start producing before we hire any more,” Palmer said.
Section 4.5 of the New York–New Jersey Transportation Agency compact ended the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission’s existence except for winding up its affairs and directed that its records pass to the new agency. New Jersey’s statutes date the commission’s expiration to May 4, 1959, when the state completed its enactment of the compact (chapter 13 of the Laws of 1959, as amended by chapter 24); Congress consented on September 21, 1959. A 1963 Daily News retrospective later said the commission had “quietly expired in March, 1959.” Its work on adapting Long Island Rail Road lines and building an East River crossing remained part of later New York City transit debates.
The House unanimously passed a resolution granting Congressional consent to the compact. The agency was to prepare an interim and a long-range plan for commuter transportation across the Hudson, with recommendations due in June 1961.
The state’s Division of Rail Transportation proposed using $30 to $40 million in New Jersey Turnpike reserves, and annual sums after that, to help railroads pay their taxes and to lend for modernization. The plan needed approval from the Legislature, the voters, and two-thirds of turnpike bondholders. The Republican state chairman called it “half-baked.”
The Senate gave unanimous consent, adding amendments that required Congressional approval of the agency’s long-range plan and of any change in the compact. The resolution went to President Eisenhower.
In a statewide referendum, New Jersey residents turned down the proposal to divert surplus New Jersey Turnpike Authority revenues to railroad assistance. The state began a railroad subsidy program in 1960.
The Assembly voted 43–10 to extend the Division of Railroad Transportation through 1962 and 51–3 to appropriate $25,000 to the New York–New Jersey Transportation Agency. Both measures went to the Senate. Alfred Beadleston supported the extension while criticizing the division’s secrecy; William Musto argued that the Port Authority should take responsibility for the transit problem.
The Metropolitan Regional Council proposed an agency representing the three states, New York City and the council to channel public grants and loans to commuter railroads. It would determine operating deficits, apportion support and plan improvements or integration of facilities. Connecticut Governor Abraham Ribicoff endorsed the proposal and suggested creating the agency through gubernatorial action while his legislature was out of session; Governor Robert Meyner promised consideration.
The association endorsed the Metropolitan Regional Council’s effort, through Mayor Wagner, to establish an agency representing the three states, New York City, and the council. It said the bi-state agency, “while in being is not yet in operation,” could be enlarged or replaced, and urged applying for federal highway planning funds for a comprehensive study.
The Division of Railroad Transportation proposed $6 million a year in state service contracts, consolidation of Shore passenger service under the Pennsylvania Railroad, and rerouting Jersey Central trains through Newark. It asked the Port Authority to buy 90 H&M cars for $8.55 million and lease them to the railroad, while placing H&M under bi-state control. The report opposed handing the Port Authority New Jersey’s entire rail problem; longer-term proposals included extending rapid transit and integrating services.
The legislature authorized a Passenger Service Contract Program to pay railroads for maintaining essential service. The initial $6 million program required existing facilities and fares to be retained while the state pursued longer-range consolidation and improvements. In January 1961, Highway Commissioner Dwight Palmer told a Senate committee that continued contracts were essential to preventing more train and branch-line abandonments.
Colonel S. H. Bingham, a former executive director of the New York City Transit Authority, sent the three governors a plan for a tri-state agency to run a high-speed system built from linked existing lines, at a maximum of $317 million against at least $915 million for an entirely new system. A month later Newsday reported it had been “greeted with silence and apathy.”
Thomas M. Goodfellow told the Municipal Forum of New York that a three-state authority with the power and resources to plan and coordinate all commuter travel was the only solution. “Rail commuter service must be recognized and treated for what it is—a public service,” he said.
The Port Authority agreed to devote up to 10 percent of its general reserve fund annually to commuter-rail improvements under legislation prepared for New York and New Jersey. The proposal marked a departure from its resistance to rail subsidies, but its financial limits soon became a central dispute in the legislation to acquire the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad.
At Senate hearings on Harrison Williams’s mass-transit bill, Regional Plan Association vice-president Walter Binger proposed a three-state agency to distribute federal capital loans and contract with railroads for service. He offered several institutional routes: a broader Port Authority, an expanded New York–New Jersey Transportation Agency, a federally chartered corporation, or a new interstate compact. The proposal connected federal aid to regional responsibility for how service would be provided.
Assembly transportation chairman J. Edward Crabiel opposed the H&M purchase bill he had co-sponsored, promising to overhaul restrictions on further Port Authority rail commitments. He also challenged the linkage between acquiring the railroad and approving the World Trade Center, arguing that New Jersey should receive comparable benefits. The dispute exposed disagreement over whether the H&M rescue would begin a broader transit role or limit it.
Governor Nelson Rockefeller signed legislation to continue the New York–New Jersey Transportation Agency for five years and allow it to consider freight transportation while planning commuter improvements. The agency, created in 1959, was due to expire in June. New Jersey and Congress still had to approve the extension before it could take effect.
The bi-state transportation agency, two New York state offices and the Port Authority were jointly studying how 1.676 million people reached Manhattan’s central business district. The findings would inform a city review of staggered working hours. Deputy state transportation director Bayard Forster said the continuing research would then examine travel between suburbs, extending the inquiry beyond trips into Manhattan.
Highway Commissioner Dwight Palmer certified a crisis in travel between New Jersey and New York, a required step before New Jersey’s commuter-income tax took effect. The measure sought to redirect New York income taxes paid by New Jersey residents toward interstate transportation. Palmer proposed using the proceeds for rail and bus support, equipment, reroutings, park-and-ride facilities and related improvements; the plan was already expected to face a constitutional challenge.
The Regional Plan Association endorsed the Port Authority’s proposed H&M acquisition as an emergency measure while calling for eventual coordination by a three-state commuter agency. It urged studying through service and connections with New Jersey railroads and New York subways before buying equipment or investing heavily in the uptown tubes. RPA also opposed acquiring the Hudson Terminal office building solely as a profit-making real-estate investment.
The governors of Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey created the Tri-State Transportation Committee as a temporary body to study and act on the region’s transportation problems.
An October 1960 editorial describes earlier agreement on an interstate study committee. The February 1963 report and July 1965 retrospective date creation of the Tri-State Transportation Committee to August 1961.
Governor Robert Meyner appointed a New Jersey local cooperating committee to work with the Tri-State Transportation Committee. It consisted of the freeholder directors of ten counties, chaired by Middlesex County’s Karl Metzger, and was intended to contribute local knowledge and assistance to regional transportation and land-use studies. The arrangement gave county governments a formal advisory role in the governors’ new planning effort.
L. Alfred Jenny presented a Teaneck-commissioned plan connecting North Jersey railroads to a double-tunnel U-shaped route through midtown and downtown Manhattan. Designed for standard railroad equipment, it could carry freight outside rush hours and eventually offer through passenger service as suburban lines were electrified. Jenny argued that the H&M tubes were too small and urged a new bi-state transportation authority rather than assigning the project to the Port Authority.
New Jersey was paying five railroads $6.55 million for service through August 29, 1962, covering an estimated 96 percent of essential commuter and suburban operations. Payments were based on car-miles operated. The state and three railroads also hired engineers to plan consolidation and improvements. The operating contracts provided immediate support while the newly organized Tri-State committee worked toward a broader regional plan.
The two states had the Port Authority take over the bankrupt Hudson & Manhattan Railroad, now PATH, alongside the World Trade Center. The statute included a covenant that further deficit financing of railroad projects would be undertaken only within set financial limits, which the Authority read as 10 percent of its General Reserve Fund.
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