Who would pay for a railroad that crossed the Hudson?
A regional rail plan reached the state legislatures. Why did the new transit district never exist?
Explore the caseRegional transportation institutions took shape through agreements and disagreements over money, jurisdiction, representation and operating control. This chronology follows those decisions across New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, with links to the reporting and records behind them.
Begin with a historical conflict below, or use the complete timeline to trace events by date. The companion newspaper archive preserves the reports themselves. Event dates describe when something happened; publication dates describe when its sources appeared.
Read the history, follow dated turning points, then examine the original evidence.
A regional rail plan reached the state legislatures. Why did the new transit district never exist?
Explore the case ↗Why could eleven affirmative votes fail to approve a regional plan—and how did the commission disappear?
Explore the case ↗What did the football train demonstrate about coordinating railroads—and what remained untested?
Explore the case ↗Dates refer to events; source citations include publication dates.
140 events
Engineer L. Alfred Jenny proposed a loop rapid-transit line from the Hackensack Meadows under the Hudson to about 57th Street, down Manhattan, and back through Jersey City, with transfer stations wherever it crossed a New Jersey railroad. The New York–New Jersey Port and Harbor Development Commission turned it down. Jenny kept offering variations for 30 years.
The Legislature set up the commission to study the transit problem. It took a traffic census in 1924 and warned in its 1926 report that New Jersey “must give immediate and thoughtful consideration to the transit problem.”
The North Jersey Transit Commission published an engineering plan for a loop rapid-transit system connecting Manhattan with the North Jersey railroads.
The Port of New York Authority and the North Jersey Transit Commission organized the board with railroad officials and the Westchester Planning Committee to coordinate plans for an area-wide solution.
After spending more than $220,000 on studies, the board produced another loop plan but adopted no program, and disbanded. The North Jersey Transit Commission ended the same year with a warning that the highway projects under way would not meet all the area’s needs.
The association’s 1935 report said: “Motor vehicles cannot supplant rail facilities as a means of commuter transportation between New Jersey and Manhattan.” The North Jersey Transit Committee, formed the same year, backed a transit plan by consulting engineer L. Alfred Jenny of Dumont.
Valentine Christian proposed a 37½-mile open-cut railroad from Mahwah to the George Washington Bridge and across its lower level. The proposed system was estimated at $41 million and became one of the unbuilt alternatives later recalled in debates over a regional commuter network.
The Bergen County Rapid Transit Association proposed a subway from Paterson along Route 4, across the George Washington Bridge and downtown via the Ninth Avenue elevated. Its $40–50 million plan included feeder connections from the Susquehanna and West Shore railroads and north–south buses.
Ordered in 1936 to make a new study, the Port Authority proposed a suburban rapid transit system for northern New Jersey that carried the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad from 33rd Street to 51st Street and across to New Jersey through a new tunnel. Its report said good rapid transit could add millions of dollars in property values. The New Jersey Legislature directed another study; in 1939 the Authority asked for more time, “and nothing more was heard of the proposal.”
Two articles date the plan to 1937; The Jersey Journal’s 1966 account gives 1938.
New Jersey legislators considered a bill to create a railroad authority. The proposal died when the Legislature adjourned.
Governor Alfred E. Driscoll suggested that commuter railroads share a terminal in the Hackensack meadows where riders could transfer to a rapid-transit line into Manhattan.
The New Jersey Legislature established the Regional Planning Commission, headed by Senator David Van Alstyne. Its work developed a regional approach to the metropolitan rail problem and preceded the separate New York and New Jersey rapid-transit commissions created in 1952.
After two years studying commuter transportation, the Regional Plan Association recommended a special interstate commission to examine the regional transportation system as a whole. President Paul Windels later presented that proposal as the basis for a fresh approach to rail investment and Manhattan congestion.
The New Jersey Regional Planning Commission, headed by State Senator David Van Alstyne of Englewood, recommended that a metropolitan rapid transit authority be created and report to the 1953 Legislature. Its report also recommended a new rail tunnel connecting North Jersey with Manhattan at about Forty-fifth Street.
Senator David Van Alstyne introduced a metropolitan rapid-transit commission bill in New Jersey on February 11; Senator Greenberg of Brooklyn introduced its counterpart in New York on February 21. The Regional Plan Association endorsed the two bills on March 3, arguing that rail improvements were essential to relieving road congestion.
Governor Driscoll appointed the commission’s members, among them Senator Van Alstyne. The legislation creating it provided $50,000 for studies of transit improvements. New York had set up a separate commission of its own.
Goodhue Livingston Jr. criticized the New York commission for “dragging its feet” and said it had been stymied by Governor Dewey. The commission’s vice chairman acknowledged that no staff had been hired; New York had given its commission $10,000 and New Jersey $20,000.
Hearings before the New York Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission, with New Jersey’s commission sitting in, renewed interest in seeing the region’s mass transportation needs whole. A subsequent New York Times editorial called the question of subsidizing commuter railroads the first to decide.
After the separate commissions issued almost identical reports, both Legislatures adopted their recommendation and the New York–New Jersey Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission came into existence, with $50,000 from each state. Its vice chairman dated this to June 1954; a 1955 New York Times editorial gives June 14, 1953.
A memorandum of understanding between the Port Authority and the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission was made public. The Authority would furnish up to $500,000 for engineers to study rail rapid transit between New Jersey and New York. The memorandum urged a “constitutionally sound, financially practicable and politically feasible plan of meeting deficits.”
Governor Meyner announced he would approve a $150,000 appropriation for the commission. With $150,000 approved by New York and $500,000 available from the Port Authority, the Times wrote, “an inquiry of respectable thoroughness should be possible.” Meyner also named a new set of New Jersey members.
The Monmouth County Planning Board adopted a resolution urging the commission to include the county in its study of New York–New Jersey transit problems, citing its growth in year-round commuter traffic.
Henry K. Norton, chairman of the New York, Susquehanna & Western Railroad, presented the commission with a plan for rapid transit lines from the tri-state suburbs running on overhead tracks in New York. Real estate operator William Zeckendorf objected that the city would not stand for another elevated railroad.
Mayor Robert F. Wagner Jr. convened the Metropolitan Regional Conference, later known as the Metropolitan Regional Council. This voluntary association of the top elected officials of the counties and major cities of the tri-state region discussed shared problems such as regional traffic control and water and air pollution. New York City paid most of its $50,000-a-year cost.
The chamber announced it would present its program to the commission on September 10. Three points, including a new East River tunnel at 76th Street, were already in engineering studies the commission had authorized.
John A. Kervick of the commission told the Jersey City Real Estate Board that rail transit everywhere requires some public support, but that the commission expected a proposal costing “no way near the fantastic estimates of a billion and upward.” Co-chairman Charles H. Tuttle warned the same day that only a strong interstate body could keep a transportation policy going.
Paul W. Johnston told the Bergen County Chamber of Commerce that commuter railroads should be paid for unprofitable service as utilities are, with any excess cost spread among the municipalities that benefit. The Record concluded that the choice in rail commuter service “seems to be abandonment or subsidy.”
Project director Arthur W. Page recommended two new Hudson River tunnels, at about Fifty-ninth Street and at the Battery, carrying a rail loop that would connect New Jersey’s commuter lines with Manhattan over BMT subway tracks. A new bi-state district with a 32-member council would run it and assess counties for an estimated $12 million annual deficit.
About 100 county leaders in Teaneck heard the commission’s executive director outline the plan. Bergen’s share of the deficit would be $1.84 million a year, the largest of any county. Formal hearings were set to begin June 18 in Newark.
Representative Frank C. Osmers Jr. proposed an alternative to building new Hudson tunnels: use Hudson & Manhattan’s tubes, the planned George Washington Bridge lower deck and, if necessary, a Lincoln Tunnel tube. The tentative proposal sought economies in a regional loop, but confronted capacity limits and prior commitments of the road crossings to motor traffic.
The Interstate Commerce Commission granted requests to discontinue Hudson River ferry lines used by riders on three railroads serving Bergen County. A federal court order kept the ferries going pending a final decision.
The commission opened hearings in Newark on what The Record called “the nineteenth New York area transportation survey since the early 1920s,” moving to New York on September 17. Critics, including Representative Frank C. Osmers Jr. and engineer L. Alfred Jenny, pressed lower-cost alternatives.
At the Arden House conference on metropolitan problems, Robert Moses said that if any agency was needed to unify rapid transit it should be the Port Authority, and called the railroads “a busted, lazy and backward private enterprise.” The Port Authority’s executive director rejected the idea at once, saying transit would wreck the Authority’s credit.
The panel included the chairman of the New York City Transit Authority, the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad’s trustee, and the president of the Central Railroad of New Jersey. Morris Pesin of the Jersey City Merchants Council planned to ask “what Jersey is going to get out of it.”
State Senator Walter H. Jones of Bergen County pledged to support a workable program after the commission’s final report, but hoped it would not carry “a $12 million deficit millstone around its neck.”
The commission’s modified plan dropped the BMT tracks for a new subway up Fifth and Madison Avenues and routed the line through Journal Square, raising the cost by $100 million and the annual deficit to $14.5 million. Critics called it “disappointing,” “wasteful,” and “monstrous.” New York’s attorney general said a constitutional amendment might be needed.
The Transportation Act of 1958 expanded the Interstate Commerce Commission’s authority over railroad passenger-service discontinuances. The Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission warned that reliance on state regulators and courts could no longer assure continued commuter operations, while Senator Clifford P. Case later called for an investigation of the drive to abandon services.
After three years and more than $1 million of study, the commission recommended a $500 million loop and, as its one legislative proposal, a bi-state transit district to plan and negotiate a system. It concluded that a coordinated, modernized system of transit by rail and bus between New York and New Jersey was essential.
Two reports are dated January 1959. Articles from February, November, and December 1958 describe the final report as already delivered, supporting a January 1958 date.
Senator Walter H. Jones introduced a bill to create a Metropolitan Transit District with a 32-member council, 16 from each state, and $150,000 a year from each state for five years. An identical bill was introduced in the New York Legislature the same day. Any plan would need approval from both Legislatures.
The Senate passed the Jones bill, S-50. Opponents later said the necessary eleventh vote came from Senator Sido Ridolfi of Mercer County, and that seven of the eleven senators in favor represented counties that would bear none of the deficit.
Herman T. Stichman, trustee of the bankrupt Hudson & Manhattan Railroad, told a Bergen County group that the Port Authority “has never concerned itself with the rail transportation problems of the metropolitan area.” He said connecting Erie and Susquehanna trains to the tubes and subways could be done for less than $100,000,000.
In a letter to the Governor and Legislature, the commission said the transit district act “does one thing only—it creates a public agency, based on local representation, to develop and to negotiate such a public plan.” The Herald News noted that Congress had since given the Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction over railroad passenger service, and the ICC was letting railroads curtail it.
Lyle C. Fitch, First Deputy City Administrator, told the National Tax Association that the only clear benefit of the half-billion-dollar loop would be to its users, who should pay the entire bill. He called transportation “a region-wide problem” needing coordination of agencies and pooled revenues. He spoke for himself, not the city administration.
The Jersey City Commission adopted a resolution opposing the bill. Morris Pesin of the Jersey City Merchants Council called the loop “a noose around the neck of Jersey City” and urged the Assembly to compel the Port Authority to connect New Jersey’s railroads to the Hudson & Manhattan tubes instead.
Frank H. Simon told the Hackensack Area Development Association that “you and I will not in our lifetimes see them take on rapid transit projects.” He called a comprehensive regional agency the desirable ultimate, but said anyone attempting it “would be like Don Quixote attacking the windmill.”
Port Authority executive director Austin J. Tobin argued for more than two hours that the Authority could not spend on transit and submitted a 46-page memorandum. The Assembly’s economist, Dr. Salomon J. Flink, countered in a 57-page report that the Authority could set aside earnings to cover part of a transit deficit. The commission’s co-chairmen asked for action; the Regional Council asked for a tri-state approach.
About 20 people attended a Newark hearing on how to tackle metropolitan problems; Newark was the only New Jersey municipality to send an official. The council, elected officials who had met informally for more than two years, was weighing whether to seek formal status, and a committee under Columbia’s Wallace Sayre was to report on January 13.
After two public hearings the bill was rewritten as a ten-member agency appointed by the two governors, with any property tax for deficits expressly barred. It reached the floor but lacked the votes. The Lehigh Valley and the Lackawanna then said they would seek to abandon most of their passenger services.
Jersey City Mayor Witkowski, who had led the council’s opposition to the district, called its traffic and transportation committee together: “Having played a large role in the defeat of the transit district, I feel it is up to the regional council to offer constructive plans.” Senator Clifford P. Case called for a Senate investigation of efforts to rid railroads of commuter service.
A Regional Plan Association committee of eight headed by Columbia’s Wallace S. Sayre urged that the voluntary council be established by identical statutes in the three states and a compact approved by Congress, with a small full-time secretariat. “The present mass transportation crisis,” it said, “is but a foretaste of the difficulties which will soon and increasingly press upon the region.”
With the commission preparing to go out of business, the Port Authority opposed, and the counties unwilling to be taxed, Senator Wesley L. Lance proposed a state Division of Railroad Transportation to act as a “catalyst agent.” He said the Port Authority should underwrite part of any deficit: “When we speak of rapid transit, we are speaking about a deficit operation.”
Governors Rockefeller, Meyner, and Ribicoff held a transit conference and heard railroads, labor, communities, and the Port Authority. Senator Walter H. Jones called it “a black day for New Jersey commuters and for the growth of regional concepts,” saying the governors of New York and Connecticut had washed their hands of the commuter problem.
The Senate passed the Assembly’s bi-state transit district bill 12 to 1, with most abstainers calling it futile, and the Assembly voted 53 to 3 for a State Division of Railroad Transportation in the Highway Department. The district bill could not become law unless New York enacted identical legislation. A bill to hand the problem to the Port Authority stayed in committee. In Albany the Senate voted 56 to 1 for an Office of Transportation in the governor’s executive department.
Governor Meyner signed the bill setting up a bi-state rapid transit agency. Two weeks later New York passed a different version, and New Jersey had to amend its law to match.
Asked by Senator Lance whether the Authority might help pay for a connection between the Jersey Central and the Hudson & Manhattan, estimated at $15 to $40 million, Austin J. Tobin replied that it was legally impossible to contribute from present revenues or reserves.
The Plainfield Common Council voted unanimously for the resolution despite a letter from Tobin warning that involvement in the rail crisis “could well lead to the destruction of the Port Authority as a useful agent.” The sponsor answered that “the Port Authority was created to do this job.”
By 39 to 15 the Assembly approved a New York–New Jersey Transportation Agency with one member from each state and $25,000 from each, and by 36 to 16 let the Port Authority borrow $20 million from New York State to buy coaches for lease to three New York railroads. Opponents said the car program was meant to preclude a larger Port Authority role. Assemblyman Musto asked who Austin Tobin was “to tell us they can’t do it,” adding: “We created the Port Authority.”
Governor Meyner and Highway Commissioner Dwight R. G. Palmer were cool to the Regional Plan Association’s proposal for a three-year study of metropolitan transportation. “There are so many agencies now, I would like to see some of them start producing before we hire any more,” Palmer said.
The House unanimously passed a resolution granting Congressional consent to the compact. The agency was to prepare an interim and a long-range plan for commuter transportation across the Hudson, with recommendations due in June 1961.
The state’s Division of Rail Transportation proposed using $30 to $40 million in New Jersey Turnpike reserves, and annual sums after that, to help railroads pay their taxes and to lend for modernization. The plan needed approval from the Legislature, the voters, and two-thirds of turnpike bondholders. The Republican state chairman called it “half-baked.”
60 of 140 events loaded.