Beyond The Terminal Trap

Penn Station, the very heart of American rail, stands as a stark, almost tragic paradox. It is, at once, the nation’s busiest transportation hub—a throbbing artery connecting millions—and yet it remains burdened by century-old infrastructure and operating practices that fall short of meeting 21st-century demands. While cities around the globe have embraced the future of rail with through-running—a system where trains glide effortlessly through central stations rather than terminating—New York clings to an outdated, congested stub-end model that not only limits capacity but also forces inefficient, disruptive turnaround maneuvers.

Imagine the possibilities. Experts have demonstrated that through-running can double or even triple a station’s effective capacity while dramatically cutting operating costs. Smoother commutes, reduced delays, and enhanced regional connectivity are not theoretical ideals but proven outcomes observed in cities that have dared to modernize their rail operations. Yet the “Railroad Partners” (Amtrak, New Jersey Transit, and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority) remain entrenched in a status quo that, for decades, has disappointed commuters who face unreliable schedules, inefficient turnaround procedures, and excessive dwell times.

Historically, the inefficiencies of stub-end terminals have been noted—from early analyses of commuter rail performance to comprehensive field studies by experts who have tracked how modern through-station concepts boost productivity. Stub-end configurations force trains to back up, turn around, and reengage lengthy switching procedures. In contrast, a through-running design eliminates these wasted minutes, enabling each track to serve as a continuous artery for both passengers and, potentially, freight and mail—maximizing every investment in infrastructure. This is not just about engineering; it is about rethinking the very purpose of urban rail as a dynamic, self-sustaining component of metropolitan transportation.

The success stories abroad—from Philadelphia’s Center City Commuter Connection to Tokyo’s intricately linked network, from Paris’s transformative RER to London’s incremental Thameslink improvements—demonstrate that the obstacles are not insurmountable engineering challenges but a failure to reimagine operations. In each case, dismantling the long-accepted notion of the terminal station unlocked enormous capacity gains and spurred economic regeneration. This historical record underscores a fact that modern commuter rail critics have long overlooked: an efficient, unified through-running system can provide far more value with lower operating subsidies than isolated, incremental terminal expansions.

The arguments advanced by the Railroad Partners for a $16.7 billion stub-end expansion rest on a false premise—that simply adding more tracks can overcome the fundamental inefficiencies of trains having to reverse direction. No amount of additional terminal space can erase the inherent delays and energy wasted in turnaround movements. Through-running, by radically reducing dwell times, transforms Penn Station into a dynamic hub that not only improves the passenger experience but also fosters economic growth by better linking New Jersey, Long Island, and even far-flung suburban markets.

Crucially, the case for through-running resonates with recent political and community priorities. Leaders have recently rejected plans that would destroy vibrant neighborhoods in the name of station expansion. A future built on integrated, through-running service preserves urban fabric and avoids the costly, disruptive demolition of historic blocks. Instead of expanding physically into sensitive areas, the focus must shift to a smarter, more efficient operational paradigm that makes optimal use of existing infrastructure while planning targeted, incremental upgrades.

At the heart of this vision lies a radical reimagining of governance. The real barrier is not the geometry of Penn Station but the fragmented, self-interested operations of multiple agencies. Only by establishing a unified authority—one with the power to harmonize timetables, negotiate labor conflicts, and coordinate capital investments—can we truly tap into the potential of through-running. The experience of cities worldwide is clear: overcoming institutional inertia is not only possible, it is essential for transforming outdated, inefficient terminal systems into models of modern transit excellence.

The path forward is both practical and urgent. Short-term measures, such as standardizing platform heights and electrification segments, pilot cross-running services between NJ Transit, Metro-North, and the LIRR, and deploying integrated scheduling software, can yield immediate benefits. These actions will not only improve service reliability and reduce operational costs but also build the political and public support necessary to drive long-term, phased infrastructure investments.

In the end, through-running is not a pie-in-the-sky ideal—it is a proven, empirically grounded strategy to reimagine Penn Station as a true nexus of urban mobility. With disciplined leadership, robust governance reform, and a commitment to incremental yet transformative upgrades, New York can finally break free of the terminal trap. This is not merely a technical fix but a visionary reallocation of public resources that honors our rich transportation heritage while boldly paving the way for a more efficient, equitable, and connected future.

Let us rise to meet this challenge. For the sake of millions of commuters, for the economic vitality of the region, and for the integrity of our urban communities, through-running is the only viable path forward for Penn Station—and for the future of American rail.

WHY THROUGH-RUNNING IS CRUCIAL

The inescapable truth is that stub-end tracks, by their very nature, necessitate extended dwell times. No amount of platform widening or passenger flow enhancements can alter this fundamental equation. Through-running, with its promise of radically reduced dwell times, offers a far more effective and sustainable solution, one that attacks the core problem rather than merely masking its symptoms.

A Region’s Potential Held Captive

The consequences of this operational dysfunction extend far beyond the realm of abstract metrics, impacting the daily lives of millions in tangible and often frustrating ways. These are not mere numbers on a spreadsheet; they represent lost hours, missed connections, and the daily anxieties of a commuting public held captive by an inadequate system. While Penn Station’s configuration is a significant contributor to delays and service reliability issues, a truly comprehensive solution must also address the broader context, including fare policies, last-mile connectivity, and the overall architecture of the regional rail system.

Yet, through-running stands as the key to unlocking the region’s vast, unrealized potential. By forging seamless connections between New Jersey and Long Island, it would create a truly integrated regional rail network, opening up new travel corridors, igniting economic growth, and enhancing the quality of life for millions.

A Masterclass in Connectivity

Philippe Crist, a leading authority on transportation policy, succinctly captured the essence of the through-running imperative with a potent analogy:

“Imagine a city in which you could drive into different points of the city, but you couldn’t drive through the city… The functionality of driving a car would be greatly deterred. It’s the same for rail connectivity.”

This analogy transcends the technical intricacies of rail operations; it speaks to the fundamental principles of mobility, connectivity, and the very heartbeat of a thriving metropolis.

Why Through-Running is the Only Viable Path Forward

The primary argument in favor of expanding Penn Station with more stub-end tracks, as championed by the $16.7 billion plan, rests upon a seductive, yet fundamentally flawed, premise: that a simple increase in track capacity will proportionally alleviate congestion. This is a dangerous oversimplification, a mirage that obscures the stark reality of the situation.

While more tracks might offer a sliver of additional capacity, the inherent limitations of reversing trains remain stubbornly in place. They will still generate conflicts at interlockings, still monopolize platforms for extended periods, and still necessitate wasteful midday yard movements. This approach merely amplifies the existing problem rather than offering a genuine resolution.

Through-running, in stark contrast, fundamentally rewrites the equation. By drastically curtailing dwell times, it empowers each existing track to handle a significantly greater volume of train traffic. The resounding success of Philadelphia’s Center City Commuter Connection (CCCC) stands as a powerful testament to this principle. There, a similar embrace of through-running yielded a dramatic surge in throughput, achieved with fewer tracks. This is not a theoretical abstraction; it is a proven blueprint for success, one that New York can, and must, emulate.

Why Through-Running is the Superior Investment

The Railroad Partners present the $16.7 billion Penn Station expansion as the practical solution, branding through-running as a costly, infeasible alternative. Yet their plan rests on a misleading assumption: that more terminal tracks will alleviate congestion in a way that justifies the cost. The reality is starkly different—for every dollar spent, the stub-end expansion yields marginal capacity gains compared to the transformative potential of through-running.

Diminishing Returns: The Expensive Limits of Terminal Expansion

The proposed expansion adds new stub-end tracks, but does nothing to remove the bottlenecks created by turnaround operations. The fundamental capacity constraint at Penn Station is not the number of tracks, but the lengthy dwell times imposed by reversing trains. No amount of added terminal space can solve this operational flaw.

1. Cost Per Additional Train Slot: Terminal Expansion vs. Through-Running
   • The stub-end expansion increases peak-hour throughput by only 40%, while through-running more than doubles throughput using existing tracks.
   • Expanding a terminal adds only a fraction of the capacity that through-running unlocks, yet requires significantly higher capital expenditures per additional train handled.
   • In comparative cost-benefit terms, every billion dollars invested in through-running upgrades delivers far more additional train movements than a billion dollars spent on stub-end expansion.
2. Terminal Dwell Costs vs. Continuous Flow Efficiency
   • Stub-end operations trap track space in inefficiencies: trains must arrive, unload, switch crews, and reverse—often sitting for 15-20 minutes before departing.
   • Through-running eliminates this wasteful cycle, allowing for a continuous flow of trains in and out of the station, dramatically improving capacity without requiring more physical infrastructure.
   • If capital is to be spent, it should be on eliminating dwell-time constraints, not adding infrastructure that only marginally mitigates their effects.
3. The Hidden Costs of the Stub-End Expansion: What the Railroad Partners Don’t Advertise
   • The Railroad Partners’ plan requires a significant expansion of midday storage facilities, a cost conveniently omitted from their feasibility study.
   • A larger terminal footprint means higher long-term maintenance costs, increased station staffing, and more train crew hours spent in unproductive layovers.
   • Through-running, by contrast, drastically reduces midday train storage needs, allowing infrastructure and workforce resources to be reallocated more productively.

A Smarter Use of Capital: Strategic Investment vs. Expensive Expansion

The false logic of the stub-end expansion is that it assumes a bigger station means a better station. But this thinking ignores how rail systems are optimized:

• The most efficient networks increase track productivity, not just track quantity.
• Through-running generates greater mobility benefits for less capital investment than the Railroad Partners’ plan.
• By linking currently disconnected markets—Long Island and New Jersey, for example—through-running creates new revenue opportunities that a stub-end expansion simply cannot.

A Capital Plan That Fails Its Own Justification

If cost-effectiveness is truly the guiding principle, the Railroad Partners’ expansion plan fails its own test. A billion dollars spent on through-running yields exponential capacity improvements, while a billion dollars spent on terminal expansion merely stretches an outdated model to its limits. The Railroad Partners ask for billions in public funds to build a station that remains an operational bottleneck. That is not investment—it is institutional inertia disguised as pragmatism.

Why This Matters Beyond Mobility

Run-through service doesn’t just help trains; it reorders how the city and suburbs connect. Reverse-commute possibilities become more feasible if lines extend beyond Manhattan’s core, offering direct routes to suburban job centers or vice versa. Meanwhile, cutting midday yard runs recaptures tunnel capacity for off-peak passenger service. This fosters better equity (e.g., linking underserved communities in Newark or Queens to suburban jobs) while slicing carbon emissions from highway congestion. Such intangible gains rarely appear in cost-benefit tallies for a stub-end expansion, but they proved decisive in Philadelphia’s successful real estate renaissance around Market East Station, to say nothing of Tokyo’s and Paris’s dynamic stations.

Lessons from Peer Cities Near and Far

I. The Fallacy of Institutional Determinism in New York’s Rail Policy

New York’s Penn Station lies at the confluence of multiple commuter and intercity rail services, yet operates with a fundamentally inefficient design. Instead of allowing trains to pass through seamlessly, the station forces them to terminate, reverse, or lay over in limited track space. This design constrains capacity, inflates operating costs, and creates a suboptimal experience for passengers. Detractors of through-running—the seamless operation of trains between two or more terminal points via one central corridor—insist that technical complications, institutional disagreements, or high capital costs make it an unworkable proposition.

Those arguments stem from a broader assumption: that the difficulties of aligning multiple agencies, harmonizing rolling stock, and constructing or modifying infrastructure represent insurmountable barriers unique to New York. In other words, they portray the current system as the inevitable outcome of historical forces, local politics, and physical constraints. This view suggests that solutions common elsewhere simply cannot apply here. The reality, however, is that the present structure persists because of policy decisions rather than ironclad technical limits. Penn Station’s stub-end configuration, and the failures it perpetuates, remain in place largely because local actors have not made it a strategic priority to change them.

In many ways, New York has allowed “institutional determinism” to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Agencies resist altering labor rules or schedules, citing a lack of political consensus; policymakers avoid championing large-scale improvements, fearing costs and complexity; each stakeholder blames another for the system’s inertia. Yet around the world, cities of equal or greater complexity have repeatedly tackled similar barriers and instituted through-running—expanding capacity and boosting ridership in the process. 

A. Framing the Argument

Through-running is often misunderstood as solely an engineering fix—one that might require extensive track reconstruction or advanced signaling systems. In truth, through-running is best viewed as an overarching operational paradigm. It calls for trains to continue through the core of the city to other destinations, rather than ending their journeys at a central terminus. This structure reduces dwell times, grows network capacity, and makes transit more convenient by minimizing forced transfers.

Critics of through-running in New York argue it is an unrealistic, perhaps utopian, scheme. They point to the complexity of inter-agency coordination among Amtrak, NJ Transit, and the Long Island Rail Road (LIRR), as well as the station’s limited platform space. Yet similar critiques surfaced in other metropolises prior to their successful implementation of cross-city rail corridors. The fact that those systems overcame comparable barriers indicates that Penn Station’s biggest obstacle lies not in the physical realm but in entrenched mindsets. Through-running is not a fringe idea; it is a strategic choice proven to revitalize cities, strengthen regional economies, and modernize public transportation systems.

B. The Inconsistency of the Railroad Partners’ Position

The agencies operating in and around Penn Station have expressed contradictory positions over the years. On one hand, they acknowledge that capacity is nearing—or has reached—its practical limit. On the other, they propose incremental expansions or terminal enhancements (such as Moynihan Train Hall) that do little to address the root cause of congestion. These agencies contend that modest improvements will somehow resolve operational logjams or adequately expand throughput, yet in practice, the same constraints persist.

Such mixed messaging reflects a deeper ambivalence toward genuine structural reform. Some officials claim that differences in electrification standards, union contracts, or track alignments are immovable obstacles, despite clear precedents of agencies elsewhere unifying or coordinating their systems. Moreover, the same partners often collaborate on major capital projects (e.g., East Side Access) that are far more complex than the incremental changes needed to advance through-running. Their selective reasoning underscores that the real roadblock is less about feasibility and more about a reluctance to disrupt the status quo.

C. Through-Running as a Strategic Imperative

Through-running should not be viewed merely as a technical adjustment at Penn Station; it should be recognized as a linchpin of modern urban policy. High-capacity commuter rail lines that flow through the city core can unlock a host of socio-economic benefits. They lessen the reliance on costly terminal space, reduce train turnaround inefficiencies, and make commuting far less laborious. These factors, in turn, enable more frequent service, more balanced regional development, and reduced road congestion.

Treating through-running as an imperative reframes infrastructure spending from a narrow cost-benefit calculation into a long-term investment with broad returns, much like major water or utility projects. At a time when cities worldwide are competing for talent and looking to minimize carbon footprints, a robust through-running network can enhance New York’s global competitiveness and environmental sustainability. If Penn Station remains a dead-end for most trains, the region may lose out on key opportunities for growth, equity, and resilience. Policymakers must therefore see through-running not as a niche alternative but as a strategic backbone for 21st-century mobility.

II. The Philadelphia Model: Reconnecting a Fragmented Rail System through Strategic Investment

Philadelphia’s Center City Commuter Connection (CCCC) is widely recognized as the most consequential rail infrastructure integration in modern American history—a short tunnel with transformative implications. Prior to its opening in 1984, Philadelphia’s regional rail network was a tale of two systems. On the west side of Center City, the Pennsylvania Railroad terminated at Suburban Station; on the east, the Reading Company’s lines ended at Reading Terminal. Though separated by barely a mile, these stub-end terminals enforced a disjointed, inefficient commuter rail experience, making it impossible to travel seamlessly across the city by train.

The CCCC, conceived as early as the 1950s and championed in Philadelphia’s 1960 Comprehensive Plan, aimed to rectify this fragmentation with a direct, 1.7-mile, four-track tunnel that extended the Pennsy’s infrastructure eastward, passing beneath Center City to link with the Reading network north of Vine Street. The tunnel cost approximately $325 million in 1981 dollars (over $950 million in 2025 terms), including related upgrades to interlockings, rolling stock modifications, and station infrastructure​.

Its completion allowed for through-running of regional rail trains for the first time in any U.S. city, creating an integrated network from what had been incompatible systems—differing in electrification, labor contracts, and operational practices. Suburban Station was reconfigured, and the new Market East Station (now Jefferson Station), constructed at a cost of $75 million, became the eastern anchor. Together with 30th Street Station to the west, these formed a continuous spine through the core of Center City.

A. Transformative Outcomes: Operational Efficiency and Urban Revitalization

The tunnel did not merely connect rail lines—it unlocked the latent potential of Philadelphia’s transit system. According to Transportation Research Board analysis, the integrated system achieved up to a 53% reduction in the number of trains required on some routes, with a 22% reduction in crew hours and a 5.5% decrease in train-miles, despite offering the same service coverage​. These efficiency gains emerged not from fleet expansion, but from reconfiguring train movements to minimize idle time and unnecessary direction reversals at terminal stations.

The economic effects were equally significant. The CCCC spurred a wave of private development in the long-declining east side of Center City, particularly around Market East. Projects such as One Reading Center (now the Aramark Tower) and the Gallery shopping complex—Philadelphia’s first postwar urban mall—were catalyzed by the improved accessibility the tunnel afforded​. Officials later credited the CCCC as foundational to Philadelphia’s 1980s resurgence, especially for enabling reverse commuting and knitting together the fractured urban fabric.

B. Institutional Hurdles and Political Resolve

The project was far from an inevitability. Its realization required federal, state, and local cooperation, amid severe fiscal constraints. The GAO in 1981 identified significant shortcomings in planning, including failure to account for over $75 million in related capital costs outside the core grant agreement​. Moreover, early years of operation coincided with a period of declining ridership, driven in part by steep fare hikes—65% over 17 months—and labor strife, culminating in a systemwide strike in 1983​.

Yet the project succeeded where so many have failed because of an unusually unified policy commitment. Labor standardization was negotiated across legacy railroads. SEPTA, created in 1963 and slowly consolidating fragmented private operations, became the central governing entity. The CCCC marked not just an engineering feat but an administrative triumph—melding rolling stock, signaling, and staffing across previously incompatible systems.

C. Implications for Penn Station Through-Running

Philadelphia’s experience is more than an historical artifact—it is a contemporary parable for cities facing similar constraints. New York’s Penn Station today bears many of the same symptoms that plagued pre-CCCC Philadelphia: a terminal station bottlenecked by incompatible services (NJ Transit, LIRR, Amtrak), institutional fragmentation, and inertia reinforced by legacy infrastructure.

The Philadelphia case demonstrates that transformative change doesn’t always require megaproject-scale expenditures. The CCCC was a compact project, less than two miles long, yet it redefined the region’s transportation logic. It didn’t add new lines or expand the commuter rail footprint; it made what already existed work better, by unlocking latent capacity and creating new trip patterns through intelligent connection.

Moreover, it shows that the barriers to through-running—often cited as technical, operational, or financial—are surmountable when regional integration is made a governing priority. If Philadelphia in the 1970s and 80s could overcome bankrupt railroads, fractured jurisdictions, and incompatible equipment standards, then the integration of public agencies sharing the same infrastructure today is not a technical impossibility—it is a matter of political will.

III. The Tokyo Model: Integrating Hyper-Complexity Through Incremental Through-Running

Tokyo’s rail network is nothing short of extraordinary—widely regarded as the busiest and most complex metropolitan transit system on Earth. Each day, the railways of Greater Tokyo effortlessly manage around 40 million passenger journeys, a staggering figure greater than the entire transit ridership of the New York metropolitan region combined. The network is not run by a single central authority, but rather by a diverse array of operators including the enormous JR East group (the privatized successor of Japan’s National Railway), highly competitive private railways (such as Tokyu, Odakyu, Seibu, Tobu, Keio, and Keisei), and publicly-owned subway operators (Tokyo Metro and Toei). Historically, these independent operators developed distinct corridors with differing electrification methods, train types, fare structures, and labor practices.

Despite this inherent fragmentation, Tokyo has successfully achieved a remarkably cohesive network. Its method? Incremental integration through a concept known locally as chokutsū unten—through-running. In essence, through-running involves trains from suburban lines continuing seamlessly onto central subway lines without passengers having to transfer. Rather than imposing a single, unified master plan, Tokyo’s planners and rail operators methodically built these integrations over decades through small-scale, targeted connections. Each step—such as linking Tokyu’s Den-en-toshi suburban line with the Tokyo Metro Hanzomon subway—provided immediate benefits, such as shorter journey times, fewer transfers, and higher ridership. These tangible improvements reinforced political and public support for further incremental expansions, creating a positive feedback loop that facilitated additional investment.

By the 1990s, and increasingly so today, through-running had become central to Tokyo’s rail infrastructure. Major terminals such as Shinjuku, Shibuya, and Tokyo Station emerged as bustling hubs where services from numerous operators intersect seamlessly. In the busiest sections, trains arrive as frequently as every two minutes or even less during peak hours, delivering service intensity comparable to the world’s densest metro systems. This ultra-frequent service is essential for sustaining Tokyo’s unparalleled population density and meeting relentless commuter demand.

A. Conquering Complexity: Tokyo’s Lessons for New York’s Penn Station

When examining through-running potential at New York’s Penn Station, critics often point to the terminal’s complexity: three operators (Amtrak, NJ Transit, and LIRR), varied electrification systems, aging infrastructure, and entrenched labor agreements. Yet, Tokyo’s example clearly demonstrates that such complexity need not be a permanent roadblock.

In Tokyo, transit planners grappled with a multitude of operators far exceeding Penn Station’s trio. They navigated a labyrinth of electrification standards—most lines use 1,500 volts DC overhead wires, but some subway lines utilize 750 or 600 volts DC third rail systems. Tokyo even contends with two fundamentally incompatible track gauges: the narrow 1067 mm gauge used by most suburban and national lines (including JR East and Tokyu’s Den-en-toshi Line), and the wider 1435 mm gauge used predominantly by subway systems and a handful of private railways. While gauge differences present a significant obstacle, operators have repeatedly overcome nearly every other technical barrier. Multi-voltage trains are now commonplace, easily switching power sources mid-journey. Sophisticated signaling and operating protocols allow trains from different companies to safely share the same tracks. Labor arrangements permitting operators’ crews to cross corporate boundaries have been thoughtfully negotiated.

Tokyo’s sustained success underscores a key principle: technical complexity—while challenging—can be strategically managed, provided there is clear political resolve and willingness among stakeholders to collaborate.

B. Incremental Integration: Building Success Step-by-Step

Crucially, Tokyo did not gamble on a monolithic megaproject promising immediate integration. Instead, planners took an incremental approach, methodically connecting corridors step-by-step. A notable example of this strategy is the Tokyu Corporation’s integration of its Den-en-toshi Line with Tokyo Metro’s Hanzomon Line, completed between the 1970s and 1980s. Initially, the Den-en-toshi Line served suburban communities southwest of Tokyo. When it began through-running with the Hanzomon subway line into central Tokyo, the benefits quickly materialized: ridership surged, congestion eased, and suburban real estate values increased substantially.

With these tangible results in hand, both public authorities and private investors gained the confidence to finance additional integration projects. Incremental progress also provided valuable operational learning opportunities, enabling planners to refine complex schedules, optimize rolling stock deployment, and iteratively improve station designs. By steadily delivering visible improvements, planners built sustained political support while avoiding the risk and backlash that often accompany large-scale infrastructure projects.

C. Efficiency Gains and the Multiplier Effect on Demand

As Tokyo gradually connected more lines, it dramatically expanded ridership and reshaped travel patterns. Commuters who previously faced multiple transfers or circuitous routes now enjoyed efficient, one-seat rides between suburbs and the city center. This newfound accessibility generated demand far exceeding initial projections—an effect known in transportation planning as induced demand. Neighborhoods surrounding connected stations quickly flourished, attracting residents, businesses, and investors, particularly around transit-oriented developments spearheaded by railway companies themselves.

Operationally, through-running substantially increased efficiency by eliminating the need for time-consuming train turnarounds at terminals. Trains circulated continuously, significantly improving the productivity of rolling stock, increasing the effective capacity of tracks, and allowing more frequent off-peak service. At its busiest sections, equipped with advanced signaling and control technologies (like CBTC and ATC), Tokyo’s operators maintain extraordinary frequencies, running trains every two minutes or less during peak hours. This transforms suburban railways into regional metro systems—ultra-efficient corridors seamlessly blending urban and suburban mobility.

D. Tokyo’s Playbook for Penn Station: Turning Complexity into Opportunity

Tokyo’s achievement in rail integration, despite unmatched institutional complexity, offers critical insights for New York’s Penn Station:

• Technical barriers are surmountable: Differences in electrification, signaling, rolling stock, and labor practices can be managed through targeted investments, innovative technology (such as multi-voltage trains), and collaborative agreements.

• Quality service generates demand: Tokyo repeatedly demonstrates that reliable, seamless, high-quality transportation induces ridership growth far beyond existing projections.

• Through-running transforms entire regions: Effective rail integration is not merely about transit—it’s an engine for sustainable economic development, enhanced real estate values, and efficient land-use patterns.

Ultimately, Tokyo’s decades-long journey towards rail integration sends a compelling message to New York and to transit planners worldwide: institutional complexity is not an unyielding barrier. With clear political commitment, strategic incrementalism, and collaborative stakeholder engagement, extraordinary integration is achievable, unlocking enduring benefits for cities and regions alike.

IV. The Paris Model: Uniting Rival Systems Through Vision and Engineering

Paris’s Réseau Express Régional (RER) stands as a powerful example of bridging deep divides between historically separate rail systems. Before the RER’s creation, Paris’s rail landscape was fractured. Suburban lines were the domain of the national railway, SNCF, operating with its own rolling stock, signaling, and protocols, primarily using overhead electrification (1,500V DC near the city, 25kV AC further out). Urban transit, including the dense Métro network, was the fiercely independent territory of the RATP, which utilized different standards and, where applicable, third-rail power. Each organization possessed a distinct technological DNA and operating culture, complete with separate fare structures—making seamless regional travel an often-frustrating multi-step process.

Against this fragmented backdrop, the RER emerged in the 1970s as a revolutionary concept: create a hybrid express rail network that would weave existing suburban branches directly through the urban core via new, dedicated tunnels. The launch of RER Line A in 1977 was the watershed moment, physically connecting RATP- and SNCF-operated segments. This integration was made possible by a crucial innovation: multi-system trains engineered to automatically switch between different power supplies mid-route. RER Line B soon followed, integrating disparate lines to forge a vital link between Charles de Gaulle Airport, the city center, and southern suburbs. Subsequent lines—C, D, and E—were layered onto the network over the following decades, further extending this model of combining existing surface routes with new central underground connections.

Operating at remarkable, metro-like frequencies in the central tunnels—capable of handling up to 24 trains per hour during peak periods—the RER fundamentally changed Parisian mobility. It eliminated the obligatory, time-consuming transfer between suburban trains and the Métro at congested mainline termini like Gare de Lyon or Gare du Nord for countless journeys. This newfound connectivity effectively reconfigured the Paris region, stimulating development around suburban RER stations and granting traditionally peripheral communities direct, rapid access to the heart of the city.

A. Breaking the Stalemate: Overcoming Institutional Barriers

The visionary idea of the RER was initially met with deep skepticism and resistance from the very organizations it sought to unite. Both SNCF and RATP, entrenched in decades of operating in parallel universes, feared a loss of autonomy, control over revenue streams, and the daunting technical challenges of integration. Labor unions voiced concerns about merging distinct job classifications and pay scales, while engineers questioned the practicalities of running trains across different electrification systems. Forging cooperation seemed, to many, almost unimaginable.

Ultimately, it took forceful political will at both the national and regional levels to break the deadlock. Policymakers recognized the strategic necessity: Paris faced crippling Métro overcrowding and rising automobile dependence. They understood that simply expanding the legacy systems piecemeal would never suffice. By championing the RER, they committed to a unified mobility strategy, forcing the resolution of both technical incompatibilities and long-standing administrative divides.

B. Weaving the Network: Engineering and Operational Solutions

Integrating Paris’s physically distinct railways required ingenious engineering and meticulous operational planning. The core solution involved digging new deep-level tunnels to create a subterranean backbone beneath central Paris, linking SNCF lines north, south, east, and west. The massive, multi-level Châtelet–Les Halles station emerged as the pulsating heart of this new network, one of the busiest underground stations in the world.

Technically, the linchpin was the deployment of trains engineered with the remarkable ability to “read” the power supply—be it overhead catenary (at 1.5kV DC or 25kV AC) or, historically on some RATP sections, third rail—and switch systems automatically without stopping. To manage the intense traffic flows, advanced signaling systems (like SACEM on RER A) were introduced, enabling trains to operate safely at headways as tight as two to two-and-a-half minutes.

Operationally, success demanded unprecedented coordination. Maintaining reliable high-frequency service required trains across two different organizations’ territories to run with near-perfect punctuality—a tightly choreographed ballet demanding joint control centers and aligned dispatching protocols. Over time, the introduction of standardized rolling stock suitable for this hybrid operation (like the versatile Z 20500 series and later generations) further streamlined maintenance and enhanced the passenger experience.

C. A Region Transformed: Economic and Urban Impact

The RER didn’t just move people more efficiently; it reshaped the Paris region’s economic geography. Suburban areas blessed with RER access witnessed significant economic uplift, attracting new businesses, fostering job creation, and experiencing notable increases in real estate values compared to less-connected areas. The convenience of a reliable, one-seat ride into central Paris made these municipalities prime locations for both residential and commercial development, supporting a more polycentric growth pattern that relieved pressure on the historic core.

Crucially, the RER also absorbed vast passenger flows, alleviating chronic overcrowding on parallel Métro lines. Daily ridership climbed steadily into the millions—by the late 2010s, the entire RER system was carrying approximately 2.7 million passengers each weekday. This overwhelming success validated the massive investment and reinforced the strategy of integrating regional and urban rail travel, streamlining mobility for the entire Île-de-France region.

D. Paris’s Blueprint: Debunking Arguments Against Integration

The obstacles overcome in forging the Paris RER directly counter many arguments frequently deployed against implementing through-running at New York’s Penn Station. The familiar refrains—clashing bureaucracies, incompatible technologies (like electrification), and prohibitive costs—were all present, and arguably just as daunting, in Paris decades ago. Yet Paris proved these challenges are surmountable with sustained political leadership and strategic vision.

Furthermore, the RER experience decisively refutes claims that suburban areas lack sufficient ridership potential for such investments. Critics questioning demand ignore a key lesson demonstrated by Paris: high-quality, integrated rail service creates its own demand, often stimulating the very demographic and commercial growth used to justify it later.

Finally, Paris’s experience challenges the narrative that through-running must necessarily equate to an astronomically expensive, single-shot megaproject. The RER was built incrementally over decades, strategically reusing vast stretches of existing infrastructure linked by essential new tunnels. This contrasts sharply with daunting multi-billion dollar figures often cited in New York discussions. While direct cost comparisons across eras and nations are complex, Paris’s success highlights how phased implementation and institutional cooperation can deliver transformative network integration far more cost-effectively than worst-case projections might suggest. Paris provides a powerful blueprint for how vision and persistence can overcome fragmentation to build a truly regional rail system.

V. The London Model: Unlocking Capacity Through Incrementalism

For over a century, London’s mainline rail network operated as a constellation of isolated fiefdoms. Grand Victorian termini like King’s Cross, Victoria, Paddington, and Waterloo served as definitive endpoints, forcing passengers traversing the city onto the crowded Underground. This terminal bottleneck, a legacy of 19th-century development, made the concept of seamlessly connecting northern and southern rail routes through new tunnels seem a distant, perhaps unattainable, prospect for decades.

Yet, a modest but pivotal breakthrough occurred in 1988. British Rail reopened the Snow Hill Tunnel—a largely dormant Victorian-era connection previously used for freight and limited services—to launch the Thameslink service. Initially a relatively low-cost initiative linking Bedford north of the capital to Brighton on the south coast, its impact was immediate and profound. The service unleashed a wave of latent demand for through-running journeys, proving commuters craved one-seat rides across central London. Ridership surged, overwhelming forecasts despite the route’s inherent limitations: short platforms restricting train lengths, aging signaling systems, and congested trackwork, particularly around the critical London Bridge node.

The success was undeniable. By 1991, British Rail proposed “Thameslink 2000,” an ambitious plan to fundamentally upgrade the corridor. However, this vision stalled for years, entangled in the complexities of rail privatization and persistent funding challenges. Eventually, recognizing the project’s transformative potential, the government committed to the multi-phase Thameslink Programme. Delivered through carefully staged “Key Outputs” (0, 1, and 2), this massive undertaking involved rebuilding core stations, untangling track conflicts with new grade-separated junctions, and deploying state-of-the-art signaling enabling Automatic Train Operation (ATO) in the central section. By the late 2010s, the fully rebuilt London Bridge station and associated upgrades allowed an intense frequency of 24 trains per hour in each direction through the heart of London. Thameslink had evolved from a pragmatic experiment into a vital artery, effectively shattering a century of terminal inertia and reshaping London’s transport geography.

A. The Unlikely Catalyst: Proving the Demand

The birth of Thameslink was less a grand strategic vision and more an act of pragmatic operational housekeeping by British Rail. Reopening the Snow Hill Tunnel offered efficiencies: smarter train routing, potential disposal of surplus railway land, and reducing unproductive “deadhead” movements of empty trains to depots. What wasn’t fully anticipated was the explosive public response.

This seemingly modest operational tweak triggered a structural shift in travel behavior. Commuters enthusiastically embraced the newfound ease of crossing London without changing trains. The line’s overwhelming popularity swiftly exposed how the city’s terminal-centric rail traditions had long suppressed significant, unmet travel demand. Even the limitations of the Victorian-era tunnel—its alignment and signaling not initially designed for high-frequency passenger services—could not contain the tide of riders. Within a few years, the evidence was clear: a major capacity expansion wasn’t just desirable, it was essential. Thameslink became the accidental, indispensable proof-of-concept, demonstrating that relatively small interventions could spark seismic shifts in how a city moves.

B. Strategic Phasing: Delivering Transformation Incrementally

The challenge of transforming the initial Thameslink service into the high-capacity corridor envisioned required a strategic, stepwise approach. The modern Thameslink Programme was deliberately broken down into manageable phases, each designed to tackle specific bottlenecks while delivering tangible benefits along the way.

• Key Output 1 focused primarily on enabling longer trains, extending platforms at crucial central stations like Farringdon to accommodate 12-car services, significantly boosting capacity per train.
• Key Output 2 involved the most complex and disruptive elements, centered around the complete reconstruction of London Bridge station and the intricate “surgical intervention” of constructing the Bermondsey Dive Under—a grade-separated junction eliminating critical conflicting train movements south of the river.

Complementing these major infrastructure works was the introduction of a new fleet: the high-capacity Class 700 trains. These were equipped with advanced signaling interfaces for ETCS Level 2, the technology enabling high-frequency Automatic Train Operation (ATO) through the congested central core.

This phased implementation proved crucial. It mitigated the risks associated with a single, massive project, allowed the public to see and experience steady improvements, and arguably made continued political and financial support more sustainable. By avoiding an all-or-nothing gamble, the Thameslink Programme gradually wove its enhanced capacity into London’s transit fabric, building momentum and providing invaluable lessons for subsequent mega-projects like Crossrail (now the Elizabeth Line).

C. Lessons for Penn Station: An Incremental Path Forward

London’s Thameslink journey offers a compelling blueprint for unlocking the potential of New York’s Penn Station. It powerfully demonstrates that achieving the benefits of through-running—connecting commuter lines currently terminating at the station—does not necessarily demand a single, prohibitively expensive megaproject from the outset.

Instead, a strategy of incremental, targeted improvements can yield significant early wins. Initial steps like coordinating schedules between agencies, ensuring rolling stock interoperability, or constructing limited track connections could begin to increase capacity, improve reliability, and crucially, demonstrate the value of integrated operations. These successes can build political momentum and public support for subsequent, more ambitious phases.

Thameslink’s history also underscores that institutional and bureaucratic inertia often presents a greater obstacle than sheer engineering complexity. London’s expansion faced lengthy delays due primarily to privatization upheaval and funding disputes, not insurmountable technical barriers. New York’s complex tri-agency environment presents similar institutional challenges, but as London showed, these can be overcome with sustained leadership and a clear, shared vision.

Ultimately, Thameslink reveals that even initial, partial steps toward through-running can profoundly reshape regional travel patterns and unlock significant economic benefits. By adopting a phased approach—progressively integrating the suburban lines of New Jersey Transit and the Long Island Rail Road through Penn Station—New York can emulate London’s success. Each completed stage would deliver tangible improvements, building the case for continued investment and ultimately realizing enormous payoffs in ridership, regional economic development, and improved quality of life across the tri-state area.

VI. Through-Running is a Choice, Not an Impossibility

A. The Global Record is Clear

Across Philadelphia, Tokyo, Paris, and London, the evidence is overwhelming: through-running transforms regional travel, catalyzes economic growth, and efficiently uses existing infrastructure. Each city faced institutional gridlock, technical disparities, and political skepticism. Yet each city ultimately found ways to integrate separate rail lines and operate them as cohesive, high-capacity corridors. None of these transformations occurred overnight; each demanded sustained policy leadership, phased investments, and occasional compromise among stakeholders.

The relevance to Penn Station is indisputable. If Philadelphia could dig a tunnel to unify two separate railroads; if Tokyo could align half a dozen private operators under shared fare cards and signaling; if Paris could bridge national and municipal agencies despite their distinct electrification systems; and if London could repurpose a forgotten tunnel to create a commuter revolution, New York can certainly do the same.

B. New York’s Excuse-Making is a Policy Decision 

Agencies in the region repeatedly claim that through-running at Penn Station is too expensive, too complicated, or too fraught with labor conflicts. Yet such objections are policy decisions disguised as technical inevitabilities. Labor contracts can be renegotiated; signaling systems can be updated; rolling stock can be standardized. The real question is whether policymakers, transit leaders, and the public are willing to prioritize integrated service over preserving existing silos.

The reluctance to pursue through-running underscores a deeper acceptance of mediocrity. Rather than treating Penn Station’s congestion and inefficiency as crises needing bold solutions, many officials cling to half-measures that expand terminal capacity or reconfigure station concourses without addressing the root operational flaw. In an era where cities compete globally for investment and talent, continuing to treat Penn Station as a stub-end depot is neither inevitable nor wise. It is simply a choice—a choice to forgo a proven path toward a more dynamic and inclusive region.

C. The Path Forward

A fully integrated, through-running Penn Station would unfold over multiple stages:

1. Short-Term Coordination
   • Standardize platform heights and electrification segments where feasible.
   • Harmonize crew deployment rules between NJ Transit and LIRR to allow pilot “cross-running” of certain services.
   • Develop shared fare media, building on digital ticketing solutions that could unify commuter rail with subways and buses.
2. Targeted Infrastructure Investments
   • Construct or reconfigure select track connections around Penn Station, such as improved access near Sunnyside Yard or Secaucus.
   • Enhance signaling to allow smoother flow and reduce headways in the station approaches.
   • Introduce dual-power or flexible-compatibility rolling stock that can operate seamlessly across different electrification zones.
3. Scaled Expansion and Service Optimization
   • Gradually schedule more routes that cross from New Jersey into Long Island or vice versa, maximizing the station’s through capacity.
   • Explore mid-distance through-runs that connect distant suburbs, possibly linking Metro-North as well, once the East Side Access corridor demonstrates the benefits of cross-agency collaboration.
   • Continuously refine labor agreements, adopt new train control technologies, and expand station facilities to match rising demand.

Success will require disciplined leadership, transparent communication with stakeholders, and a willingness to learn from cities that have achieved similar goals. With each incremental step, public confidence can grow, political support can solidify, and the region can begin to see Penn Station as it should be: a genuine hub of a unified, 21st-century rail system. Through-running is not a luxury or a dream; it is a practical, empirically grounded approach to making one of the world’s greatest cities even more dynamic and equitable for millions of residents and commuters.

2. THE REAL BARRIER: GOVERNANCE REFORM

2.1 Institutional Inertia, Not Technical Impossibility

The largest stumbling block is not, in fact, the structural columns or track reconfigurations, but
the organizational inertia that ties each operator—Amtrak, NJ Transit, LIRR, Metro-North—to its own traditions,
schedules, yard usage patterns, and union work rules.

As Paul Lewis, Principal of Deutsche Bahn E.C.O. pointed out: “In Berlin, there are 41 different operators of transit in the region—buses, local rail, subway, regional rail, and everything in between. But as a user, you’d never know it. There’s one ticket, one timetable, one network.”

That unified rider-centered framework can exist in a similarly multifaceted system, yet it demands governance structures that transcend parochial habits. The 2024 feasibility study’s “fatal flaws” revolve around each agency treating its midday yard moves, electrification nuances, and crew territories as inviolable facts. This stance transforms potential synergy into an unbridgeable chasm.

Counterargument & Refutation
The Railroad Partners’ official line is that “multiple operators and labor rules” make run-through all but impossible. But Tokyo’s private rail lines overcame proprietary differences far larger than mere state lines; Paris overcame the RATP vs. SNCF rivalry to unify the RER. Each case demanded new governance frameworks or at least contractual agreements that recognized the mutual benefit of cross-regional ridership and avoided duplicative yard usage. If Pennsylvania and New Jersey overcame their own boundaries in 1984 for the CCCC, New York can certainly do so in 2025 or beyond.

2.2 A “Penn Station Through-Running Authority”

A fundamental first step is to create a dedicated governing body that oversees through-running operations at Penn Station, transcending the patchwork of the Railroad Partners’ separate fiefdoms.

In describing similar European models, Philippe Crist observed: “There are transportation authorities that cross boundaries, that have the ability to raise taxes and to invest in projects that benefit the entire region. They force consensus building… but in the end, they create unified plans that are funded and delivered at the scale of the region.”

This authority would:

• Unify Timetables: Adopt integrated scheduling software that merges NJ Transit and LIRR slots, ensuring rational line pairing.
• Resolve Labor-Rule Conflicts: Negotiate with unions to allow cross-territory runs; phase in crew cross-training for dual-power locomotives if needed.
• Own Capital Planning: So expansions in New Jersey or Queens, or partial platform modifications in Penn Station, serve a single, integrated blueprint—no more fractional expansions that ignore one another.

Counterargument & Refutation
Critics argue that forging new institutions is bureaucratically unfeasible. Yet the entire Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) was created to unify once-distinct commuter lines in Philadelphia. Tokyo established cooperative frameworks among private lines that historically competed. In each scenario, the region recognized that “business as usual” would hamper capacity and growth. A specialized authority is no more radical than the multi-state Port Authority or the historically bi-state nature of the MTA. If anything, it’s overdue for the tri-state region’s largest rail hub.

2.3 Governance as the Precondition for Real Capital Solutions

Without governance reform, even the best phased engineering proposals languish in concept-phase purgatory. The 2024 feasibility study’s doomsday scenario—relocating 1,000 columns or halving track counts—arises because each railroad’s “non-negotiable” constraints remain baked in. Achieving the incremental track or interlocking improvements that define a partial run-through plan requires joint scheduling, yard usage pacts, and integrated capital funding. Absent a single entity with power to override institutional habits, no plan can progress beyond theoretical sketches.

Counterargument & Refutation
The Partners might protest they already coordinate via “working groups” or “multi-agency committees.” But as the feasibility study’s dismissal of run-through shows, these committees appear to default to preserving each agency’s habits rather than forging a new integrated approach. A legitimate authority, vested with an explicit mission to implement run-through, has the leverage to reorder crew changes, reassign midday storage yards, and realign electrification or rolling-stock usage so trains can run from NJ to Queens.

3. ANTICIPATING TECHNICAL CRITIQUES—AND WHY THEY’RE SURMOUNTABLE

3.1 “But the Columns!”

The study’s loudest alarm is the claim that over 1,000 structural columns must be relocated to widen platforms. Yes, platform widening or track realignment can demand major work, but it can be phased, focusing on the columns that unlock immediate throughput or passenger-flow improvements. Techniques like micro-piling or load transfers enable partial relocations over time. London’s Crossrail, built under centuries-old infrastructure, used similar methods.

Counterargument & Refutation
Opponents conjure images of a total station teardown, effectively scaring off the public with impossible timelines and astronomical costs. In reality, partial expansions or an incremental approach to platform modifications can yield up to 80% of the capacity improvement at a fraction of the cost. No city that introduced through-running built it in a single cataclysmic stage. Tokyo incrementally introduced cross-city trunk lines. Paris unified the RER line by line. The same logic applies to Penn Station’s columns.

3.2 Turnback and Yard Requirements

The Partners claim that run-through disrupts the “necessary” midday yard storage, making the station “unworkable.” Yet the core advantage of through-running is that trains need less station or yard time: inbound runs flow outward again, either continuing to an alternate line or reversing at a turnback station in, for example, northwestern New Jersey or eastern Long Island.

Counterargument & Refutation
Yes, it requires rethinking where trains are cleaned, maintained, and stored. But partial expansions of outlying yards—like a new site near Secaucus (as already planned with the Gateway Program), or further out in Queens or the Bronx—can handle midday storage. Meanwhile, if even 50% of trains that currently vanish into West Side Yard or Sunnyside shift to cross-Manhattan passenger service runs, midday capacity at those yards frees up for the lines that truly must store trains. This logic underscores that yard usage is not an ironclad reason to reject through-running; it just needs updated operational protocols from a unified authority.

3.3 Reverse-Peak and Scheduling Complexity

Critics also point to the difficulty of reverse-peak service, contending that lines with drastically different peak flows cannot be paired effectively. But Tokyo and Paris again show that some lines carry heavier traffic, and that’s precisely what good scheduling is for—balancing frequencies, short-turning some runs at suburban stations where demand is lower, and pairing lines with roughly aligned volumes. Over time, scheduling software and integrated dispatch ensure trains flow as seamlessly as possible.

Counterargument & Refutation
Not every branch must get full two-way service at identical headways. A partial or staged approach can ramp up frequencies for lines with proven demand while preserving short-turn operations for low-demand branches. The principle of run-through is not universal coverage at all times but eliminating the pointless, time-consuming reversal of trains that could continue in revenue service.

4. A RIGOROUS STRATEGY FOR REALIZING RUN-THROUGH

4.1 Phased Implementation, Backed by Governance

The entrenched opposition of the Railroad Partners to through-running at Penn Station reflects a clinging to outdated paradigms, even as the region faces mounting pressure to modernize its rail system to meet 21st-century demands. A phased, multi-dimensional strategy, underpinned by a reimagined governance framework and pragmatic implementation, provides the clearest path to unlocking Penn Station’s latent potential. This is not an abstract exercise; it is a battle for the efficient, sustainable future of one of the world’s most important transit hubs.

The foundation of this approach lies in the establishment of an Interagency Through-Run Authority, endowed with the legal and operational power to transcend the institutional silos that have long crippled coordination among New Jersey Transit, Metro-North, and the Long Island Rail Road. Without such a unifying body, progress is impossible. This authority must be more than an advisory board; it must have teeth. It must have the power to overrule parochial interests, from legacy yard usage norms to rigid labor practices to rolling stock incompatibilities that, while daunting, are solvable through incremental reform. A successful framework of this type has precedent—whether in the cross-sector alignment of German Verkehrsverbünde or the centralized oversight of Île-de-France Mobilités in Paris—and offers a proven counterpoint to the inertia of fractured governance.

As an initial demonstration, a pilot program could link a small subset of NJ Transit lines with Metro-North’s New Haven Line, replicating the modest success of the 2009-2017 Meadowlands Football Service. The operational adjustments needed—modifications to interlockings or scheduling—are minimal compared to the potential gains: reduced dwell times, increased throughput, and early, tangible benefits for riders. Pilots are not merely technical tests; they serve as political proof points, generating the data necessary to counter resistance. Metrics such as ridership growth and on-time performance would serve as powerful arguments for scaling up.

These pilots would pave the way for targeted capital investments that enhance throughput without succumbing to the budget-busting sprawl of the current Penn Station Expansion plans. For example, platform widenings or column relocations at specific pinch points could be staged sequentially, minimizing disruption while addressing the most pressing capacity constraints. New turnback stations on peripheral lines could complement these upgrades, ensuring that through-running operations don’t simply shift bottlenecks elsewhere in the system.

The opposition’s argument often hinges on capital cost and complexity, yet these challenges are not insurmountable if paired with proper governance and funding mechanisms. Phased federal grants, tied to congestion mitigation and carbon reduction goals, offer a natural funding source for initial efforts. In parallel, value capture strategies—already demonstrated in smaller markets like Philadelphia—can unlock new streams of tax revenue from the massive real estate appreciation that through-running will catalyze in station areas and along expanded transit corridors. In a city like New York, where property values dwarf those of comparable cities, the scale of this opportunity is profound. Beyond grants and value capture, multi-state bond initiatives—shared between New York, New Jersey, and even Connecticut—would allow the financial burden to be equitably distributed, ensuring each stakeholder invests proportionally to their benefits.

Yet funding, while critical, is only part of the equation. The Railroad Partners’ opposition thrives on institutional inertia and the lack of accountability within the current planning framework. That inertia must be confronted head-on through clear mechanisms of oversight and performance measurement. A sunset clause should be applied to all capital projects that do not advance through-running, barring investments that perpetuate the reliance on midday yard storage or reversing movements at Penn Station. Meanwhile, performance metrics—from increased train throughput to reduced dwell times—must be mandated, with agencies required to publicly explain any failures to meet these benchmarks. This will establish a culture of transparency, undermining opposition narratives that suggest through-running is impractical or unmanageable.

The historical examples of Tokyo and Paris provide powerful counterpoints to the Railroad Partners’ defeatist rhetoric. Both cities overcame entrenched rivalries and bureaucratic fragmentation by deploying robust political leadership and visionary planning. New York, too, must leverage legislative or gubernatorial authority to codify the powers of a through-run governance body. Absent such leadership, parochial interests will continue to dictate the region’s transit future, to the detriment of millions of riders.

Critically, this is not merely about efficiency or cost—it is about reimagining Penn Station as a dynamic hub that serves the needs of its users, not the operational convenience of the railroads. Through-running would transform Penn Station from a chokepoint into a true gateway, expanding its functionality while enabling connections that amplify the value of every existing transit investment. Without it, the Northeast Corridor risks sinking deeper into inefficiency, dragging down the economic vitality of the entire region.

Deborah Wathen Finn stressed the region’s proven capacity for collaboration: “We did it when this region was as bad as it is… We had a Tri-State Regional Planning Commission… We did the Meadowlands Train in 2009… So, we know how to do it. It’s just that we’ve gotten disjointed… We need to go back to what we know how to do.”

5. FAILING TO REFORM GOVERNANCE = NO THROUGH-RUNNING

The conclusion of the 2024 feasibility study—that “run-through is not feasible”—is less a reflection of engineering constraints and more an indictment of institutional inertia. As long as railroads cling to entrenched practices—such as storing midday trains in the same manner as decades past, maintaining labor rules that restrict cross-territory crew operations, and channeling investments into stub-end expansions—then a fully realized run-through system will indeed remain elusive. But this is not an unavoidable engineering reality; it is a choice to sustain inefficiencies rather than reform them.

Institutional Overhaul vs. Physical Overhaul

As Philippe Crist noted about European models: “In Paris, the brand that you’ll see, whether it’s an RER train, SNCF regional train, a bus, is always going to be the name of the transport agency: Île-de-France Mobilités. It’s on all the buses, on all the trains, on all the metros, all the stations, all the bus stops have that one brand. And that brand is the region, because that’s who the project is for—not for the company, for the region, for the travelers. And so that’s kind of a meta lesson… if you’re focused on creating something for one operator, then you’re probably going down the wrong track.“

Critics may argue that governance reform is a monumental challenge, and they would be correct. Yet this challenge pales in comparison to the catastrophic disruption envisioned in the Railroad Partners’ $16.7 billion plan to expand southward into Block 780—a proposal that would demolish at least an entire city block bounded by Seventh and Eighth Avenues between 30th and 31st Streets. This expansion would erase a vibrant urban fabric including St. John the Baptist Roman Catholic Church, a historic house of worship that has served the community for generations. It would displace residents from apartment buildings, shutter local establishments like the Molly Wee pub and the Gardenia Italian deli, and tear apart the social bonds that make this area a neighborhood rather than just real estate. All this destruction would serve merely to perpetuate an outdated operational model that fails to address the fundamental inefficiencies of stub-end service.

By contrast, instituting a governance overhaul that facilitates coordinated, incremental steps toward through-running would preserve communities while dramatically improving service. A phased approach—one that gradually integrates through-running into the system—avoids the pitfalls of neighborhood demolition while tackling the root cause of inefficiencies: fragmented and outdated institutional frameworks. It recognizes the superior value of reconfiguring operations over reconfiguring city blocks. Without this critical shift in governance, Penn Station is destined to remain what it is today: a bottleneck throttling the entire Northeast Corridor, forever threatening to consume more of its surroundings without ever solving its core problems.

Moulton’s Question: A Lens on the Core Problem

Massachusetts Representative Seth Moulton distilled the challenge during a December 2021 Congressional hearing. Addressing NJ Transit CEO Kevin Corbett, Moulton posed a deceptively simple yet incisive question:

“How much would it increase capacity in Penn Station if your commuter trains ran through to Long Island and vice versa… so the New Jersey Transit and Long Island Rail Road were not turning trains around in a through station?”

This single question cuts to the core of Penn Station’s dysfunction. Why treat the station as the terminus of every service, forcing trains to stop, turn around, and head back, when it could instead function as a seamless midpoint in a unified regional network? Through-running would reframe Penn Station not as an endpoint, but as a nexus—a crossing point that unlocks greater capacity and efficiency for the entire region.

Corbett’s response was notable for its candor: he acknowledged the benefits of through-running, stating that eliminating the need to “stop, switch the head, and go back” would reduce turnaround times. He also noted that Amtrak and related agencies are nominally studying these ideas.

Yet it was Moulton’s follow-up that delivered the critical insight:

“We looked at Boston, and [through-running] increased capacity at South Station by about eight times, which is massive. It is significant. And for a station as congested as Penn, I hope you are looking at that, and considering that as you look at these Gateway tunnel opportunities, as well.”

Unified Leadership for a Regional Future

The future of Penn Station—and the tri-state region—hinges on bold leadership and collective action. Recent developments suggest a potential shift in the political landscape, with prominent voices now openly questioning the necessity of destructive expansions that would demolish entire neighborhoods without solving the fundamental operational issues. Instead, there is growing recognition that through-running offers a more elegant, efficient solution—one that preserves communities while dramatically improving service.

Riders weary of delays, businesses seeking faster and more reliable commuter access, climate advocates pushing for a modal shift from cars to rail, and civic leaders asking the “eight times capacity” questions all have a stake in driving change. Their combined voices must demand the creation of a unified governing body or compact capable of coordinating a regional approach to rail operations.

Cities like Philadelphia and Tokyo provide powerful examples of how incremental steps, guided by cohesive governance, can transform inefficient stub-end stations into thriving, interconnected transit hubs. The same is possible for Penn Station—but only if institutional reform takes precedence over the status quo. Without this shift, the promise of through-running will remain nothing more than an unfulfilled aspiration, and Penn Station will continue to constrain the growth, connectivity, and prosperity of the entire Northeast Corridor.

CONCLUSION

Penn Station does not need to stay a place where bold ideas go to die. Through-running offers a genuine path beyond the terminal trap—one that dramatically improves train throughput, slashes operating costs, boosts regional equity and real estate potential, and aligns with modern expectations for commuter rail in a global city. But none of that will materialize without first tackling the governance puzzle. Institutional comfort with yard moves and stunted schedules is the real blockade, not the columns or track geometry. Once we unify the agencies, rework timetables, and channel capital into carefully phased expansions, the station can pivot from symbol of inefficiency into a flagship of American transportation leadership. That transformation is not just feasible; it is indispensable for a 21st-century metropolis that refuses to let “business as usual” sabotage tomorrow’s mobility.

Crucially, through-running achieves what no stub-end expansion can: it increases capacity without destroying neighborhoods. It recognizes that train stations should serve communities, not displace them. The time has come to reject the false choice between improving train service and preserving our urban fabric. By breaking the bottleneck of stub-end operations, we can achieve both—better transit and livable neighborhoods—creating a Penn Station worthy of New York’s greatness.

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