The early 20th century saw the first formal recognition of a growing regional transit crisis. As the New York metropolitan area expanded, the inadequacy of fragmented transit systems became apparent. New Jersey, for example, acknowledged its inability to solve bi-state transportation issues alone. This era was marked by early state-level efforts and the influential rise of public authorities, though often with a narrow focus.

A key entity was the North Jersey Transit Commission (1922-1930), created by the NJ Legislature. It conducted vital studies, including a 1924 traffic census and a 1927 engineering plan for a NJ-Manhattan rail loop, highlighting the need for bi-state cooperation. Upon its dissolution in 1930, the Commission warned that highways alone wouldn't suffice and a comprehensive electric rail system was essential.

Simultaneously, the Port of New York Authority (PANYA, est. 1921), later PANYNJ, emerged from the NY-NJ Port & Harbor Development Commission. Its initial mandate ambitiously included operating "transportation facilities." PANYA even co-organized a Suburban Transit Engineering Board in 1928 to study loop plans. However, it soon focused on revenue-generating vehicular crossings (like the George Washington Bridge) and port facilities, largely avoiding deficit-prone commuter rail. This shift, justified by its charter mandating self-supporting projects and denying tax revenue access, became a long-standing contention in regional transit governance.

Civic groups like the Regional Plan Association (RPA) gained prominence, promoting coordinated development through reports like the "Regional Plan of 1923." Engineers such as L. Alfred Jenny and Col. W. J. Wilgus proposed various "belt and loop" systems and new trans-Hudson links. Jenny's 1921 "belt and loop" concept aimed to move both passengers and freight between North Jersey and New York City, featuring a rapid transit loop from New Durham, under the Hudson to 57th St., down Broadway, and back to Jersey City with links to other railroads. Despite these visions and local efforts (e.g., Bergen County's push for GWB rail), progress was stymied by a lack of engineering consensus, funding, political will, and later, the Great Depression and WWII. The Port and Harbor Development Commission, PANYA's predecessor, turned down Jenny's 1921 plan.

The post-World War II suburban boom intensified commuter challenges, leading to the creation of separate New York and New Jersey transit study commissions that eventually merged into the bi-state Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission (MRTC).

In 1952, New Jersey, under Governor Alfred E. Driscoll, appointed members to its MRTC, including State Senator David Van Alstyne, who had previously headed a regional intrastate projects commission that in 1950 recommended a new rail tunnel to Manhattan around 45th Street. New York, under Governor Thomas E. Dewey, formed a counterpart. City Planning Commissioner Goodhue Livingston Jr. criticized the NY commission in August 1953 for "dragging its feet," attributing delays to Governor Dewey's "lack of vision" and noting the agency had not even hired staff. These bodies, finding nearly identical issues, recommended a unified bi-state MRTC.

The bi-state MRTC was officially formed in June 1954, as reported by David Van Alstyne Jr. (then Vice-Chairman of the NY-NJ MRTC) in a 1955 letter. Led by Charles H. Tuttle (NY Chairman) and Edward J. O'Mara (NJ Co-Chairman, a former State Senator), and funded by both states ($50,000 each initially, later $150,000 each by August 1955) plus a significant Port of New York Authority (PANYA) contribution of $500,000 (and another $300,000 from the states) for studies, the MRTC undertook extensive surveys. Its major objective was to seek faster commuter service. By August 1955, Governor Meyner's approval of a $150,000 NJ appropriation (matching NY's) cleared the way for a more well-financed study. The Monmouth County Planning Board, under Chairman E. Donald Sterner, urged the MRTC in August 1955 to include Monmouth County in its studies due to its rapid population growth and commuter traffic.

A pivotal moment was the May 1957 Page Report by MRTC Project Director Arthur W. Page (former AT&T VP). It proposed a $400 million bi-state rail "loop" system, linking NJ lines (Susquehanna, West Shore, Lackawanna, Erie) to Manhattan's BMT subway via new Hudson tunnels (one at 59th St, another between Jersey City and the Battery). The plan anticipated saving commuters an average of half an hour daily. It also recommended a new bi-state "Metropolitan District" (with a 32-member council appointed by county officials) to operate the system, with projected annual deficits of $12 million covered by county taxes (Bergen County's share estimated at $1.84 million, New York City's at $3.87 million). This plan immediately faced criticism for its cost, deficit financing, and the proposed use of BMT tracks. The MRTC itself described the Page Report as a "springboard for discussion." Herman T. Stichman, trustee of the bankrupt Hudson & Manhattan Railroad, was a strenuous critic, arguing for using the existing H&M tunnels as the base of any system.

The MRTC's final report in January 1959 (publicized January 5/6) presented a modified, more expensive $500 million rail loop plan. This version scrapped the use of BMT trackage and called for a new dedicated subway line in Manhattan from Pearl Street, up Fifth Avenue to 23rd, then Madison Avenue to 59th Street, and westward to the Hudson, running through Journal Square in Jersey City. This increased projected annual deficits to $14.5 million. It reiterated the call for a bi-state transit district with a 32-member council representing counties in both states (10 in NJ, 3 in NY including NYC). However, this plan also met widespread unfavorable reaction, labeled "disappointing," "wasteful," and "monstrous" by critics like Harold Riegelman of the Citizens Budget Commission and Morris Pesin of the Jersey City Merchants Council (who feared it would destroy Jersey City's economy). State Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz warned a constitutional amendment might be needed for funding, delaying it by years.

Legislative efforts in 1958 to establish the proposed Metropolitan Transit District, based on the Page Report's earlier district concept, passed in New York (signed by Gov. Harriman in April 1958). However, the bill, introduced in New Jersey by Senator Walter H. Jones (R., Bergen), was stalled (amidst Democratic complaints it would "erase Hudson County from the map") and ultimately killed in the New Jersey Assembly in December 1958. This was due to strong opposition from counties (especially Hudson, Union, and Essex) fearing tax burdens, harm to local business centers, and the plan's perceived favoritism towards New York. The Metropolitan Regional Council (MRC), an influential body of elected officials from 21 counties in three states, chaired by NYC Mayor Robert F. Wagner and including Newark Mayor Leo P. Carlin, also opposed the MRTC's district plan in June 1958. The MRC argued it was piecemeal (excluding Connecticut, Westchester, and Long Island initially) and financially problematic, preferring a more comprehensive approach and suggesting it could draft its own measure. Maxwell Lehman served as the MRC's executive secretary.

Throughout this period, PANYA, under Executive Director Austin J. Tobin, consistently maintained its inability to undertake deficit rail transit due to its charter, bond covenants, and lack of taxing power, further complicating funding solutions. The failure of the MRTC underscored the immense political and financial hurdles to creating an integrated, bi-state transit authority. New York Governor-elect Nelson A. Rockefeller, in November 1958, called for early talks with Governors Meyner (NJ) and Ribicoff (CT) on common problems, particularly commuter transportation, signaling a potential new tri-state approach.

Following the collapse of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission (MRTC) district plan, regional transit governance shifted. Both New York and New Jersey established state-level transportation offices. In 1959, New York, under Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, created the New York State Office of Transportation. New Jersey established its Division of Railroad Transportation within the State Highway Department in 1959 (legislation enacted, with Dwight R. G. Palmer as Highway Commissioner involved in its groundwork). This division, headed by Director Herbert A. Thomas Jr. by July 1959, notably proposed using NJ Turnpike surplus funds for rail aid in July 1959 (a plan later defeated in a November referendum) and produced reports in April 1960 recommending rail consolidations, like merging Shore Line service under the Pennsylvania RR and eliminating the CNJ's Liberty Street Ferry via H&M tube connections.

A new, less powerful bi-state body, the New York-New Jersey Transportation Agency, was also established in 1959 through identical legislation in both states (NJ bill passed Feb 1959, amended and re-passed with NY version April 1959). With one representative from each state (e.g., Palmer from NJ, a state official from NY), its mandate was primarily planning and recommending improvements for trans-Hudson commuter transport, aiming to reduce deficits while preserving service with an interim plan due by June 30, 1961. It had a small starter fund ($25,000 from each state initially) and lacked major operational or capital investment powers. Its functions were later largely absorbed by a subsequent tri-state body. The Port Authority (PANYNJ) made a cautious step towards rail involvement by agreeing to borrow $20 million from New York State to purchase new rail cars for lease to the New Haven, Long Island, and New York Central Railroads, an agreement linked to the NY-NJ Transportation Agency package. This bi-state agency received Congressional consent in July 1959 (House approval) and September 1959 (Senate approval, then to President Eisenhower), with a formal compact established.

Recognizing the need for broader regional coordination, the governors of New York (Rockefeller), New Jersey (Robert B. Meyner), and Connecticut (Abraham A. Ribicoff) initiated talks, culminating in the creation of the informal Tri-State Transportation Committee in August 1960 (agreement by governors, fully operational with staff by 1961). This temporary body was tasked with studying regional transportation from New Haven to Trenton. Led by Roger H. Gilman (loaned from PANYNJ as executive director), this committee was funded by the three states and federal aid (e.g., for studies and demonstration projects like the Rockland County bus-rail feeder service—abandoned due to low ridership—and the New Brunswick Park-n-Ride). It operated with a staff of over 500 by 1964 and a budget of around $8.3 million, focusing on long-range studies and immediate action projects. The Regional Plan Association (RPA) endorsed efforts to establish a more formal Tri-State Transportation Agency around February 1960. Colonel S.H. Bingham (former NYC Transit Authority head) also offered a $317 million tri-state rail improvement plan in August 1960. Thomas M. Goodfellow, LIRR President, advocated for a tri-state transportation authority in September 1960.

The mid-1960s marked a significant formalization in regional transit governance, largely driven by federal mandates for coordinated planning to qualify for new transit funding. The informal Tri-State Transportation Committee evolved into the official Tri-State Transportation Commission, established by an interstate compact in 1965 between New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut (NJ bill signed by Gov. Hughes April 13, 1965; NY bill signed by Gov. Rockefeller June 23, 1965; CT also approved). This Commission, with Dr. William J. Ronan as a key figure (also MCTA/MTA chair), became the official planning agency for the 22-county region, developing transportation and highway-use plans. Though its powers were primarily recommendatory, it played a crucial role in channeling federal planning grants. In May 1966, it submitted a comprehensive $20 billion, 20-year regional transit program for suburban rail, rapid transit, highways, and bridges.

Concurrently, New York State took a major step into direct transit operations with the creation of the Metropolitan Commuter Transportation Authority (MCTA) in 1965, also chaired by Dr. Ronan. Its primary initial task was the purchase (from the Pennsylvania Railroad for $65 million) and operation of the Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) to prevent its collapse, taking over January 1, 1966. This initiative signaled a new level of state responsibility. By January 1967, Governor Rockefeller proposed expanding the MCTA into a larger superagency, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA). This entity was envisioned to provide unified regional policy direction and control over the NYC Transit Authority (subways and buses), the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority (TBTA), and other assets like the Staten Island Rapid Transit Service. This consolidation faced strong opposition from Robert Moses of the TBTA. Rockefeller assured bondholders would be protected and each agency within the MCTA would maintain fares sufficient for operating costs.

Other states were also active: the Connecticut Transportation Authority (CTA) was established in 1963 (signed into law July 1963 with $1M operating funds and $2M bond issue) to aid the bankrupt New Haven Railroad. These initiatives were influenced by the federal Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 (signed July 1964), providing capital funds contingent on regional planning. Civic groups like the Regional Plan Association (RPA) continued advocating for integration. In March 1965, RPA urged NJ to set up an agency to operate commuter services, stressing NJ's larger commuter problem. Despite these moves, PANYNJ maintained its policy of avoiding direct commuter rail subsidies. An ambitious December 1965 proposal by NY State Senator Thomas J. Mackell envisioned merging eight agencies (including PANYNJ, MCTA, Tri-State Transportation Commission, and TBTA) into a single Tri-State Metropolitan Transportation Authority. The Metropolitan Regional Council (MRC), a voluntary group of elected officials, also continued its work, though it faced criticism and some member defections by April 1963 (e.g., Westchester and Suffolk initially rejected new dues-paying structure). Its revival efforts by July 1967 included seeking federal grants and aiming for a $500,000 budget with NYC contributing half.

The 1970s saw intense political pressure on the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) to invest in mass transit. New Jersey Governor William T. Cahill led this campaign. This pressure led PANYNJ in February 1971 to agree to study a Weehawken-Mid-Manhattan rail tunnel and Newark Airport rail access, projects highlighted in the NJ DOT's 1972 "Master Plan" (under Commissioner John C. Kohl). A major focus was the 1962 Bond Covenant, PANYNJ's defense against deficit rail projects. After a protracted struggle, NY and NJ passed legislation in 1974 repealing the covenant for future bonds (signed by NY Gov. Malcolm Wilson), though this faced legal challenges. PANYNJ did advance some transit, notably the PATH extension from Newark to Plainfield (serving Elizabeth, Roselle Park, Westfield, Fanwood), announced in November 1972 as part of a $650 million bi-state rail program with Governor Rockefeller, linked to covenant repeal efforts. This was projected to carry 33,000 daily riders by 1980. PANYNJ also committed to a Kennedy Airport-Penn Station NY rail link.

The Tri-State Transportation Commission evolved into the Tri-State Regional Planning Commission (TSRPC) in 1971 (federally designated MPO for NY, NJ, CT). Its mandate expanded beyond transportation, becoming the MPO reviewing federal aid applications for housing, land use, and environment across the 22-county, 600-municipality region. TSRPC adopted Transportation Improvement Programs (TIPs) (e.g., a $6.1 billion list in Sept 1976 for NJ, NY, CT, including NJ Coast Line car upgrades, and projects in Monmouth/Ocean counties). However, it faced criticism. The Regional Plan Association (RPA) in April 1975 criticized TSRPC for failing to develop public support and for focusing on routine requests over serious housing/transportation issues. Local officials (e.g., Monmouth County in July 1977, May 1979) accused it of being uninformed, unresponsive, and imposing inappropriate criteria for Community Development Block Grants. It was often seen as a "rubber stamp" for state projects and dominated by gubernatorial appointees like NJ Transportation Commissioner Louis Gambaccini (by 1979). The Institute for Public Transportation (IPT) in June 1974 proposed TSRPC create a Master Plan with PANYNJ as the single regional operator.

The Metropolitan Regional Council (MRC), providing a voice for local governments via its interactive TV network (MRC-TV), saw its TSRPC funding ($240,000 from HUD "701" funds via Tri-State) cut in late 1978/early 1979 (due to Tristate's own HUD funding cuts and alleged duplication of functions), leading to its cessation in July 1979, as reported by its planning director Evan Liblit. Public engagement like the League of Women Voters' "Tri-State Town Meeting" (March/April 1979) revealed strong citizen desire (90% of respondents) for consolidated regional transit management. NJ DOT Commissioner John C. Kohl presented a 20-year, $7 billion "Master Plan" in March 1972, criticized by groups like the Ridgewood Transportation Committee for lacking priorities and relying on a Weehawken tunnel "by others." The MTA, under Dr. Ronan, was actively modernizing LIRR and New Haven services.

The 1980s witnessed the collapse of the Tri-State Regional Planning Commission (TSRPC), the region's primary coordinating body for federal aid and comprehensive planning. Throughout the early part of the decade, TSRPC faced mounting criticisms for its perceived irrelevance, cumbersome bureaucracy, and poor responsiveness to local needs. A 1981 Governors' Task Force, in its "New Directions for Regional Planning" report (March 1981), highlighted these issues, recommending stronger leadership and better community engagement, while noting absenteeism from NJ commissioners like Mayor Kenneth Gibson of Newark and Commissioner Joseph LeFante. However, the fatal blow came when the Connecticut legislature, citing fiscal problems and questioning the benefits of membership, withdrew its annual $140,000 funding in May 1981. This act triggered the dissolution of the tri-state compact, and TSRPC officially ceased operations on June 30, 1982, leaving a significant void in official tri-state regional planning and federal aid coordination.

In the wake of TSRPC's demise, the New York Metropolitan Transportation Council (NYMTC) emerged, taking over TSRPC's former offices at One World Trade Center and becoming the designated Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) for New York City and its surrounding New York suburban counties (Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester, Putnam, Rockland). However, NYMTC's role was primarily focused on channeling federal funds and ensuring procedural compliance, rather than engaging in extensive original regional planning in the TSRPC mold. This shift led to a renewed era of fragmented planning, prompting concerns among planners about the lack of a cohesive mechanism for addressing region-wide issues linking transportation with land use, the economy, and housing. The Institute for Public Administration sponsored a conference in June 1982 to discuss a new "regional framework" to fill the gap left by TSRPC, suggesting a smaller research-focused body.

Despite this fragmentation, specific transit initiatives continued. The rapid development along the New Jersey Hudson River waterfront spurred new transit considerations. A New Jersey state transportation panel in December 1985 proposed a modern light rail ("trolley") line from the Meadowlands, through a Weehawken rail tunnel, south to Jersey City, integrated with a "busway" and significantly limiting auto access and parking to prioritize mass transit in these new developments—a revolutionary concept at the time. This proposal, estimated to cost up to $850 million, envisioned funding from Trenton and the Port Authority. Concurrently, the Regional Plan Association's "River City" report called for a powerful waterfront planning agency with zoning override powers. These proposals highlighted the ongoing tension between local home rule and the need for regional oversight for large-scale projects, as well as the persistent challenge of funding, with some suggesting NJ Turnpike revenues as a source. The Tri-State Council of Economic Advisors, formed in February 1981 by business and economic development officials from the three states with TSRPC in its final year (including Charles Duffy of CT Retail Merchants Assn. as its first chair), aimed to foster common approaches to interstate economic issues such as deteriorated rail freight and passenger service, but lacked the comprehensive planning authority of its predecessor.

The 1990s saw a renewed, urgent focus on the critical need for increased trans-Hudson rail capacity. Decades of studies had consistently pointed to new rail tunnels as the most viable solution. This culminated in the formal initiation in 1995 of the Access to the Region's Core (ARC) Major Investment Study (MIS). This comprehensive study considered 137 alternatives and, in 2003, recommended advancing two primary options into a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS). The core goal of what became the ARC project was to substantially boost NJ Transit's passenger service capacity into Manhattan. The ambitious vision included new trackage, a dedicated rail yard, a new two-track tunnel, and, significantly, a new six-track, deep-cavern terminal station for NJT trains under 34th Street. A key design choice was that this new station would be adjacent to, but *not directly connected with*, the existing New York Penn Station, aiming for NJT's operational independence but creating a potential operational silo. ARC aimed to more than double NJT peak-hour trains into Midtown Manhattan.

The project, officially named Access to the Region's Core (ARC), received its Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) approval in October 2008, after scope adjustments. Earlier concepts of a "Penn Station Connector" linking new tunnels to existing Penn Station tracks had been abandoned due to engineering challenges and anticipated disruptions. With an initial estimated budget (circa 2008) of $8.7 billion (rising to $9.23 billion for full service, including 196 new rail cars), funding was planned as a joint federal (FTA committing $3 billion), New Jersey state, and Port Authority of New York and New Jersey effort. The FTA provided crucial oversight. Construction on ARC officially began in mid-2009, marking a hopeful step towards alleviating trans-Hudson congestion.

Meanwhile, the Regional Plan Association (RPA) in 1996 released its "A Region at Risk" (Third Regional Plan). This plan proposed a "reconfigured Regional Express Rail system" (Rx) designed for seamless tri-state operation, including a new Hudson River rail tunnel as part of an "optimized transit system." It explicitly identified the "absence of through-services" as a major inhibitor and proposed "Tri-State Rx" trains running from Connecticut to New Jersey via Penn Station, utilizing the Hell Gate Bridge. In February 1996, RPA also released a master plan calling for the dismantling of the Port Authority and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) to be folded into a new tri-state Regional Transportation Authority. This visionary proposal, which also included a Second Avenue Subway and new East River rail capacity, aimed to consolidate planning, funding, and management across the region, but it did not advance at the time. A notable, albeit temporary, example of through-running was the Meadowlands Rail Service pilot. Envisioned in 2007 by Connecticut Governor M. Jodi Rell and CT DOT as a proof of concept for Penn Station through-running and multi-agency integration for seamless access to the Meadowlands Sports Complex, agreements were finalized between Metro-North, NJ Transit, and Amtrak in late 2008 and early 2009. The service began operations in 2009 for football games, with three inbound and three outbound Metro-North New Haven Line trains running through Penn Station and onto NJ Transit's network, marking the first time such direct CT-NJ service occurred. Rail executives hailed it as a milestone toward a unified network, with planners expecting eventual one-seat rides from NJ points to Metro-North territory, proving through-running's viability.

The decade began dramatically with New Jersey Governor Chris Christie's October 2010 cancellation of the Access to the Region's Core (ARC) project. Citing escalating cost projections (towards $11 billion) and insufficient state funds, Christie halted the project despite approximately $600-$610 million already spent. This controversial decision created an immediate vacuum in trans-Hudson capacity planning but also spurred the rapid emergence of a new, more comprehensive vision.

In February 2011, Amtrak announced the Gateway Program, initially estimated at $13.5 billion. Unlike ARC's NJ Transit focus, Gateway aimed to benefit the entire Northeast Corridor, including Amtrak's intercity and high-speed rail ambitions, and crucially, included rehabilitation of the existing century-old North River Tunnels. The urgency for this was starkly amplified in October 2012 when Superstorm Sandy inflicted extensive saltwater damage on these tunnels. Amtrak announced in October 2014 that the damage necessitated future year-long closures of each tunnel tube for repairs, making a new tunnel essential beforehand.

The Meadowlands Rail Service, a working example of through-running, faced setbacks in 2010. An MTA budget shortfall of $400 million forced Metro-North to reduce the service from three inbound/outbound trains per game to just one each way. Ridership, already challenged by a service not designed to be competitive with driving, declined by 60% from its first season. The opening of MetLife Stadium in 2010 initially saw the Jets and Giants push for transit due to a loss of 5,000 parking spaces; however, once the old Giants Stadium site was converted to parking, this incentive diminished. The reduced service level of one train each way persisted.

Early Gateway components advanced, like the phased construction of the Hudson Yards Concrete Casing (HYCC) to preserve the new tunnel's right-of-way into Penn Station. Section 1 began in August 2013 (completed c. August 2014) with a $185 million FRA grant; Section 2 was completed by c. 2016-2018. The Gateway Program Development Corporation (GPDC) was formed in November 2016 to manage the program. However, Gateway faced major funding headwinds during the Trump Administration. Federal budget proposals for FY2018-FY2019 requested no new Capital Investment Grant (CIG) funding, vital for Gateway, and disputes arose over federal-local cost-sharing. The Hudson Tunnel Project (HTP), Gateway's centerpiece, entered FTA project development in July 2016; its Draft EIS (July 2017) saw HTP's cost estimate rise to $12.9 billion. Meanwhile, initial work on the Portal North Bridge replacement commenced, supported by a 2015 TIGER grant. By October 2016, officials like Senator Charles Schumer expressed optimism that federal financing for Gateway could be in place within two years, with construction potentially starting in 2019.

In June 2015, NJ Governor Christie, alongside NY and CT governors, created a new interstate committee to study transportation, signaling ongoing, albeit often slow, tri-state dialogue. New York City, under Mayor Bill de Blasio, established its first Regional Planning Director post in May 2016 (Carolyn Grossman Meagher appointed), recognizing the need for city-level engagement in broader regional issues. The Regional Plan Association (RPA) released its Fourth Regional Plan in November 2017, advocating for combining LIRR, Metro-North, and NJT into one unified network (dubbed Trans-Regional Express or T-REX) with through-running at an expanded Penn Station. This vision included a "Penn Station South" expansion conceived as a through-running facility with new tunnels east to Queens, projected to add more capacity than the Gateway Program as then planned. The U.S. DOT, under Secretary Anthony Foxx, proposed a rule in 2016 to require multiple Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) in a region to merge or draft unified plans, though this faced resistance and did not ultimately consolidate the region's ten MPOs. The Meadowlands Train Service was eliminated entirely in 2016, a casualty of budget cuts, shifting priorities, institutional inertia, and the loss of its original parking shortage incentive. The inconvenient 2-hour-40-minute New Haven-Meadowlands trip, required crew changes at Penn, and forced transfer at Secaucus also contributed. The loss of key political champions like Governor Jodi Rell, Metro-North President Howard Permut, and supportive NJ Transit leadership sealed its fate, even as Metro-North was advancing plans for Penn Station Access (projected for completion around 2027/2028), which would also bring New Haven Line trains into Penn Station.

The 2020s have marked a transformative period for trans-Hudson rail infrastructure, primarily characterized by significant breakthroughs in the Gateway Program's funding and construction, alongside dramatic shifts in the governance and planning for New York Penn Station's redevelopment. The passage of the federal Bipartisan Infrastructure Law proved to be a watershed moment, unlocking substantial financial commitments crucial for Gateway's advancement.

The Portal North Bridge replacement project achieved a major milestone with a Full Funding Grant Agreement (FFGA) in January 2021, securing $766.5 million in federal CIG funding. By September 2024, it was over 70% complete, with an expected completion in June 2028. More critically, the cornerstone Hudson Tunnel Project (HTP) received its Final Environmental Impact Statement and Record of Decision in May 2021, making it eligible for federal funds. The Gateway Development Commission (GDC), successor to the GPDC, became the official HTP project sponsor in September 2022. A landmark achievement occurred in July 2024 with the signing of a $6.88 billion FFGA with the FTA—the largest CIG grant ever—and the closure of $4.06 billion in RRIF loans. These, along with other federal grants (including $3.8B from FSP, $292M Mega grant for HYCC-3, $25M RAISE grant for Tonnelle Ave Bridge), solidified the HTP's financial footing based on a 70/30 federal-local cost share. Major HTP construction commenced in November 2023, with a new tunnel anticipated to be operational by 2035 and the rehabilitation of the existing tunnel by 2038. As of May 2025, enabling projects like the Hudson Yards Concrete Casing Section 3 (over 50% complete, est. 2026), Tonnelle Avenue Bridge (over 75% complete, est. Fall 2025), and Hudson River Ground Stabilization (launched July 2024, est. March 2027) are significantly advanced. Main tunnel boring contracts for Palisades and Manhattan sections are awarded (August 2024 and February 2025 respectively), with TBMs in production for a 2026 start. Other key Gateway projects like Dock Bridge Rehabilitation (est. start 2025, completion 2029, with a scope revision in April 2025 reducing cost from $375M to $235M) and Sawtooth Bridges Replacement (est. start early 2026, completion 2035) are also advancing with secured funding and contracts.

Concurrent with Gateway's progress, the long-stalled redevelopment of New York Penn Station experienced unprecedented changes in governance. While the MTA completed improvements to the LIRR Concourse and East End Gateway (opened Dec 2020, concourse renovation completed March 2023) and advanced its Penn Station Access project to bring Metro-North service to Penn (est. completion 2027, with Amtrak contributing $500M), a major upheaval occurred in the broader station renovation plans. In a February 2020 report, "The Case for Penn South," the Regional Plan Association (RPA) argued that a southern expansion of Penn Station was "desperately needed" and that plans for it were being developed with an eye toward eventual through-running. By March 2025, Governor Kathy Hochul publicly opposed Amtrak's "Penn South" expansion concept, which would have involved demolishing Block 780. This was followed in April 2025 by the Trump Administration's U.S. Department of Transportation (under Secretary Sean Duffy) assuming control of the $7 billion Penn Station renovation project, shifting leadership from the MTA to Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). A key mandate of this federal takeover was to re-evaluate through-running services as a potential alternative to the previously planned physical expansion. Furthering this potential shift, in May 2025, President Trump appointed Andy Byford, a widely respected transit leader known for his support of through-running and opposition to unnecessary demolition, to spearhead the Penn Station redevelopment as Special Advisor to the Amtrak Board. This series of events has thrown the future design and operational philosophy of Penn Station into a period of intense re-evaluation and negotiation. The RPA continued its advocacy through its "Build Gateway Now Coalition," which received renewed and increased funding from Amtrak in January 2024 ($500,000 for 18 months, following a $350,000 grant from Jan 2022). A Station Working Advisory Group (SWAG), co-chaired by RPA's Tom Wright and NYU's Sarah Kaufman, began meeting in September 2024 to discuss Penn Station alternatives, including an October 2024 railroad-commissioned feasibility study that deemed through-running within the existing footprint "infeasible," and a "Hybrid concept" presented in January 2025 that bore resemblance to earlier through-running proposals with limited expansion. The City Club of New York, with Liam Blank as Transportation Committee Chair, actively advocated for a through-running demonstration pilot via a letter to the FRA in April 2025.