From Here to There: Regional Rail for Metro New York

The Challenge

The New York metropolitan area relies on three commuter railroads—LIRR, NJ Transit, and Metro-North—that operate as “premium shuttle services” optimized solely for 9-to-5 peak travel to Manhattan. Amtrak, NJ Transit, and LIRR currently share 21 tracks and 11 platforms at Penn Station’s lowest level, connecting through tunnels beneath the Hudson River to New Jersey and beneath the East River to Queens—but instead of using the station’s through-running design as the Pennsylvania Railroad originally intended, NJ Transit, the LIRR, and Amtrak routinely reverse trains in and out of the middle zone, creating avoidable crossing conflicts and consuming platform capacity.

The station is currently operating at approximately three times its original design capacity. Many of its platforms are narrow, confusing to navigate, and lack adequate stairways, escalators, and ADA-compliant pathways—conditions that increase dwell times, delays, and safety risks. Current AM peak alighting times average 7 minutes, and PM peak boarding consumes 15 minutes per train, directly throttling the station’s throughput.

This 20th-century terminal operating model creates severe bottlenecks and prevents cross-regional mobility. The result is a system that fails to serve the modern workforce, exacerbates regional inequality by cutting off job centers outside the core, and—until this project intervened—relied on a massive expansion plan that prioritized real estate over operational efficiency.

Strategic Action

I authored the report “From Here to There: Regional Rail for Metro New York”, but the “Tri-State Solution” proposal wasn’t just abstract planning—it was a synthesis of two internal agency studies that had been withheld from the public:

• NJ Transit’s PCIP Report (Jan 2020): I identified that Alternatives 12 and 14 in this internal report provided the critical “swing space” needed to maintain operations during construction. Alternative 12 detailed a new platform and track alignment beneath 31st Street and Block 780, while Alternative 14 addressed extending Platforms 1 and 2 westward to accommodate longer trains and increase seat capacity.
• MTA/WSP White Paper (April 2021): This internal document conceded that the central zone track reconfiguration necessary for through-running was “technically feasible,” citing service disruption as the only major barrier. The lead author of this shelved report was the same engineer—Foster Nichols of WSP—who would later be tasked with evaluating the Tri-State plan publicly.

The “Tri-State Solution” connected these dots: it proposed using the PCIP swing space (Alts 12 & 14) to resolve the WSP service disruption concern, thereby unlocking the technically feasible path to through-running without expanding the station footprint. In the first phase, Platform 1 and Platform 2 would be extended and two new stub-end tracks with one new platform would be built to the south—creating room for continued service while the existing middle zone is reconfigured. Once Phase I is operational, two tracks and one platform can be removed in the central zone, making room for 5 wide platforms and 10 through-tracks for Amtrak, LIRR, NJ Transit, and future Metro-North service. The wide platforms accommodate more vertical circulation, allow for simultaneous boarding and detraining, and provide a projected 65% capacity increase by reducing average through-running dwell times to approximately 6 minutes.

Phase I Technical Diagrams (PCIP Report)

Phase II: Platform Widening Concept

The estimated cost—approximately $5.2 to $5.6 billion in 2026 dollars (escalated 40% from the original 2020 Class 5 estimates)—is roughly $11 billion less than the $16.7 billion 12-track expansion preferred by the railroads. As one investigative report noted, money spent on a smaller, smarter plan could go toward the long list of deferred Amtrak maintenance needs rather than demolishing multiple city blocks.

Key Achievements

The report’s technical viability has been battle-tested in the public arena, surviving a concerted attempt by project proponents to disqualify it:

Impact & Legacy

In February 2025, reporting by Michael Oreskes confirmed the provenance of the official “Hybrid” option now under federal review:

“[The Hybrid alternative is] a blend of a more limited expansion to the south and reconfiguration of the existing station to accommodate more trains via through-running. This idea was based on concepts from an advocacy group, the Tri-State Transportation Campaign.”

What makes Penn Station unique in the landscape of global rail infrastructure is that the hard engineering was done over a century ago. The station was designed for through-running—Amtrak does it dozens of times a day as trains pass through running between Washington, D.C., and Boston. European railroads have often had to spend billions constructing entirely new tunnels, like London’s Elizabeth Line, to link together their operations. London’s Thameslink connected two rail networks together in 1988 by putting an unused tunnel back to work. Here, in New York, the infrastructure already exists. It is simply not being used as intended.

The Tri-State Solution represents more than a technical plan—it represents the proposition that through-running is not a matter of engineering impossibility, but of institutional will. The railroads all agree that through-running is the ultimate goal; Amtrak plans to implement it for commuter railroads in a “next generation” investment, currently projected for approximately 2080. This timeline does not reflect the urgency of the ongoing climate emergency, the affordable housing crisis, or the growing mismatch between workforces and employment centers. The Tri-State Solution offers a faster path.

Ongoing Accountability

The advocacy work that began with this report has continued into an active public accountability campaign conducted through the City Club of New York’s Transportation & Infrastructure Committee:

• FOIA Request for Feasibility Study Data — Denied No. 25-FOI-00443: A formal records request sought all preliminary drafts, underlying operational modeling data, simulation inputs/outputs, and analyses used to evaluate through-running alternatives in the October 2024 feasibility study. Amtrak invoked FOIA Exemption 5’s deliberative process privilege. On appeal, Amtrak’s EVP William Herrmann upheld the denial on August 14, 2025—but the appeal response contains a significant admission: Amtrak stated in writing that “the search did not reveal any simulations or modeling data in Amtrak’s possession, and the dwell times were based on publicly available data.” If accurate, this means the quantitative analysis underpinning the 48-train-per-hour finding either does not exist as a formal model or resides solely with WSP, not Amtrak. The appeal response also confirmed that Amtrak is withholding 16 draft versions of the study plus comment logs for each draft—documents marked “progress print deliberative draft and confidential”—and that an early draft contained cost estimates for an alternative that was subsequently dropped from consideration.
• On-the-Record Admission at the August 5 Forum: The complete forum transcript—hosted by RPA and MAS at NYU on August 5, 2024—reveals that Foster Nichols publicly acknowledged the one-track constraint applied to the TSTC analysis. Describing the 31st Street cross-section, Nichols stated: “there is some room… we could get in space for one track and one additional platform… without touching, or minimal impact to Block 780.” The TSTC plan explicitly proposed two tracks with partial acquisition of Block 780—a distinction Nichols did not clearly disclose to the audience. At the same forum, Sam Turvey of ReThinkNYC challenged the shifting numbers publicly: “In March, Foster told us that ReThink would get 42 trains per hour under the Hudson River, and now it looks like I’m hearing 38.” When a separate audience member pressed Petra Messick on whether the Southern Expansion itself meets the 48-train-per-hour target, Messick responded: “We’re still in concept design… we believe it will”—declining to confirm the same standard being used to disqualify the through-running alternatives.
• RPA-Amtrak Financial Relationship — Two Appeals Required for Disclosure No. 25-FOI-00555: A FOIA request for Amtrak’s financial and contractual records with RPA required two separate appeals over four months before core documents were produced. Amtrak initially withheld all invoices, two campaign proposals (under the Procurement Integrity Act), and two Excel spreadsheets titled “RPA Contract Payments.” It also withheld two change orders—one extending the RPA contract, one adding funds—whose contents remain undisclosed. The first appeal (decided October 24, 2025) was a partial remand, directing Amtrak to consult RPA on Exemption 4 confidentiality and reassess the campaign proposals. After that consultation produced inadequate compliance, a second appeal led to the December 9, 2025 decision releasing the campaign proposals and all invoices showing total amounts billed. The resulting production—804 pages under Bates range 2026-APP-00004—documents monthly labor invoices from August 2022 through July 2025 under Purchase Order 2510090978, ranging from approximately $10,000 to $93,000 per month, plus separate event sponsorships: a $25,000 Centennial Gala “Decade Sponsorship” (2022), a $35,000 NJ Reception and Assembly Gold package (2023), a $25,000 Assembly Gold Sponsorship (2024), and a $5,000 NJ Reception sponsorship (January 2025). The 2024–25 campaign proposal requested $500,000 from Amtrak for eighteen months of advocacy. Both campaign proposals contain the assertion that RPA “will continue to operate as an independent voice”—language appearing verbatim in Amtrak-directed advocacy contracts. Individual staff names and hourly rates remain withheld under Exemption 4.
• The August 5, 2024 Forum Was Organized Under the Amtrak Contract: The July 2024 RPA invoice—submitted under Purchase Order 2510090978—explicitly bills Amtrak for staff time spent finalizing logistics, catering, building reservations, media coordination, and run-of-show preparation for the August 5 forum. That forum is where Foster Nichols of WSP presented the modified analysis of the Tri-State plan that declared a 13-train shortfall. Amtrak’s EVP appeal response separately confirmed that the invoice descriptions served as the “functional equivalent of monthly status reports” for the contract. The event was not disclosed to its audience as Amtrak-contracted advocacy work.
• Amtrak Funded RPA to Advocate for Penn South as “Through-Running”: The August and October 2023 RPA invoices bill Amtrak for active staff work on a “through-running report.” The 2024–25 campaign proposal makes the intended conclusion explicit: the report was to “explain why expanding Penn Station to the south is a way to achieve a version of Penn as a through-running station.” Amtrak was paying RPA to produce public-facing content advocating for Penn South expansion during the same period that Amtrak’s feasibility study—whose underlying modeling data Amtrak now claims does not exist “in Amtrak’s possession”—was being drafted and revised through 16 iterations.
• RPA Co-Chaired the Penn Station Working Advisory Group While Under Amtrak Contract No. 26-FOI-00194: The September 17, 2024 SWAG kickoff presentation—produced in the February 2026 FOIA response to this request—identifies the co-chairs by organization: Regional Plan Association and the Rudin Center for Transportation Policy and Management (NYU Wagner School of Public Service). The same slide defines the SWAG member role as: “Serve as champions to help build support for investment in Penn Station / Share perspectives on priorities for future Penn Station complex.” SWAG’s stated purpose is building advocacy support, not providing independent project oversight. Invoices from October 2024 through July 2025 under the Amtrak-RPA contract confirm that an RPA staff member “continued [their] role as co-chair of SWAG for Penn Station.” The formal SWAG membership criteria include Criterion 7: “Does the organization have a history of inflammatory rhetoric and/or divisive statements?”—a screen that, combined with the requirement that members be affiliated with an established organization for more than one year, appears designed to exclude project critics. That the co-chair of this body was simultaneously under contract to Amtrak to “build support” for the program was not publicly disclosed. The P3 developer selection is targeted for May 2026. Of the 293 pages produced in response to this request, approximately 224—roughly 76%—were withheld under Exemption 5.
• Amtrak Received Pre-Publication Editorial Review of RPA Research: An October 4, 2023 email from Brian Fritsch, RPA’s Communications Director, shares a draft of the “Regional Benefits of Commuting and Remote Work” report with Amtrak contacts, asking them to “review the draft and give us suggested edits and comments by next Friday, Oct. 13.” The email notes: “We took your advice and flipped the order of the report”—confirming that Amtrak had already provided structural guidance on a prior draft. This was the report subsequently published as the “Commuter Dividend” and used by RPA as independent research supporting the Gateway Program’s economic case. A separate September 2024 Amtrak email also confirms that selected stakeholders—specifically those who had “provided letters of support for our grant applications earlier this summer”—were briefed on the 200-page through-running analysis before its public release in October 2024. An internal Amtrak email from August 2022, declining an RPA dinner invitation for the incoming GDC CEO, is equally revealing: the Amtrak employee cited “avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest” while simultaneously maintaining the financial relationship, and noted it was “not necessary to acknowledge Amtrak’s support in a prominent fashion at this particular event.”
• Extended Records Request Pending No. 26-FOI-00193: On December 20, 2025, a new FOIA request was submitted seeking Amtrak’s financial and contractual records with RPA from 2017 through 2025—extending the documented period back four years beyond the 2022 start date covered by the prior production. Amtrak denied expedited processing on December 22, 2025, and upheld that denial on appeal on January 6, 2026, finding the City Club had not demonstrated it was “primarily engaged in disseminating information” under 49 C.F.R. § 701.7(e). The request remains in ordinary processing. The 2017 start date is significant: internal RPA campaign proposals reference Build Gateway Now activities as far back as July 2019, and the financial relationship’s origins predate any document yet produced.